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ABSTRACT. This Note assesses the constitutionality of Texas House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which
regulates abortion providers, as applied to clinics located in the area between the state's border
with Mexico and internal federal immigration checkpoints. Should these statutory provisions go
into full effect and lead to these clinics' closure, undocumented immigrants living in the border
zone will need to pass through the internal checkpoints to reach abortion clinics elsewhere in the
state. The Note evaluates the Texas statutory provisions as applied to border-zone clinics using
two distinct analytical frameworks: the undue burden analysis specific to abortion jurisprudence
and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The Note concludes that under either approach,
H.B. 2, as applied to these clinics, violates the reproductive rights of undocumented immigrants
and is therefore unconstitutional. The rights burden created for this group by Texas's law
regulating abortion clinics illuminates both the way in which federal-state allocations of power in
the border zone may endanger substantive due process rights and, more broadly, the relationship
between geographic space and substantive due process.
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INTRODUCTION
United States Border Patrol checkpoints lace the interior of Texas and other
southern border states, typically lying twenty-five to seventy-five miles from
the border with Mexico.' Federal law permits immigration officers "to board
and search for aliens . . . any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle"
located "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States."' At the checkpoints, agents may, pursuant to the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, "brieflly] det[ain] . . . travelers"
and "require[] of the vehicle's occupants . . . a response to a brief question or
two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the
United States."` For those within the "border zone" - the area of land between
federal interior immigration checkpoints and the international border -travel
to the rest of the country functionally requires an encounter with federal
immigration enforcement.4 As a result, unauthorized immigrants living within
the border zone avoid such travel and find their world effectively circumscribed
by the checkpoints.' State laws and regulations with spatially disparate effects,
such as recently enacted Texas legislation that compels widespread closure of
abortion clinics, therefore have particular significance for undocumented
6
immigrants in the border zone.
1. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o5-435, BORDER PATROL: AvAILABLE DATA ON
INTERIOR CHECKPOINTs SUGGEST DIFFERENCES IN SECTOR PERFORMANCE 2 (2005).
2. 8 U.S.C. 5 1357(a)(3) (2012).
3. 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 88o
(1975)).
4. See infra Section I.A. The area between the international border and the interior checkpoints
is frequently referred to as the "border zone." See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578,
584 (5th Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
5. Manny Fernandez, Checkpoints Isolate Many Immigrants in Texas' Rio Grande Valley, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.coV2ol5/i/23/us/checkpoints-isolate-many
-immigrants-in-texas-rio-grande-valley.html [http://perma.cc/4KYS-2TSG] (exploring
how the checkpoints limit travel for the approximately one hundred thirty thousand
undocumented immigrants living in southern Texas and noting that undocumented
residents refer to the border zone as "la jaula de oro"); see also Dan Solomon, Jose Antonio
Vargas, the Nation's "Most Famous Undocumented Immigrant," Has Been Released from
Detention in McAllen, TEX. MONTHLY (July 15, 2014), http://www.texas
monthly.com/the-daily-post/jose-antonio-vargas-the-nations-most-famous-undocumented
-immigrant-has-been-released-from-detention-in-mcallen [http://perma.cc/U9T6-LAHE]
(describing the challenges of passing through interior checkpoints).
6. Fernandez, supra note 5; see also Suzanne Gamboa, Jose Antonio Vargas Arrest Puts Focus on
Border Checkpoints, NBC NEWS (July 15, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://www.nbcnews.con/news
/latino/jose-antonio-vargas-arrest-puts-focus-border-checkpoints-niS6456 [http://perma.cc
/R3T6-HNSV] (interviewing an undocumented resident of south Texas's border region,
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In 2013, the State of Texas enacted Texas House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which
regulates abortion providers and could result in the closure of all abortion
clinics south and west of internal immigration checkpoints in the state.' H.B. 2
requires that all abortion clinics in Texas meet the facility requirements for
ambulatory surgical centers and that all doctors performing abortions have
hospital admitting privileges within thirty miles of their clinics." The
legislation has led to the closure of many clinics in the state9 and has
engendered both controversy and litigation. An as-applied challenge, focusing
on the extent to which courts ought to probe legislatures' health-premised
justifications for narrowing abortion availability, has reached the Supreme
Court."o The abortion providers in Texas's border area are among those unable
to meet H.B. 2's requirements: both the Whole Woman's Health Clinic in
McAllen, a city in Texas's southern Rio Grande Valley, and the two clinics in El
Paso, the metropolitan area at Texas's westernmost tip, have not been able to
do so."
Because of H.B. 2, undocumented immigrants living in southern and
western Texas face the potential closures of the only three abortion clinics in
the state that do not require travel through internal immigration checkpoints
from the border area. Roughly 822,500 women live in the Rio Grande Valley
and the nearby city of Laredo, within the border zone in the southern part of
who explained that his family did not travel to Corpus Christi for specialized medical care
and that he passed up a full scholarship at a university in Houston due to the checkpoints).
7. H. 2, 8 3d Leg., 2d Sess., 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 5013 (relating to the regulation of abortion).
The legislation also contained other restrictions on abortion, including a ban on the
procedure past twenty weeks after fertilization (with exceptions) and restrictions on access
to abortion-inducing drugs. Id.
8. Id. 55 2, 4.
9. Alexa Garcia-Ditta, The Texas Abortion Case, Explained: How a Texas Law Could Undo 43
Years ofAccess to Legal Abortion in the United States, TEx. OBSERVER (Jan. 22, 2016), http://
www.texasobserver.org/texas-abortion-case-hb-2-explained [http://perma.cc/7YXH-Y9PD]
(noting that the number of abortion clinics open in Texas has decreased from more than
forty to nineteen since the passage of H.B. 2).
1o. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2016).
n. See Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 595-96, 596 n.4 (Sth Cir.) (describing
the inability of clinics in El Paso and McAllen to meet ambulatory surgical center standards,
as required by H.B. 2, and the inability of physicians at these clinics to obtain admitting
privileges at any nearby hospital, as required by H.B. 2), mandate stayed pending judgment by
135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015); Letter from Stephanie
Toti, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, to Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit 2-3 (June 12, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content
/uploads/2ol5/o6/Texas-abortion-impact-letter-6-12-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/F5GY-ELYL]
(detailing the impending closure of the McAllen clinic and the bar to reopening of an El
Paso clinic in light of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Whole Woman's Health v. Cole).
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the state." Roughly fifty thousand have neither citizenship nor legal
immigration status and are of reproductive age.'3 Were the McAllen clinic to
close, the border checkpoints would physically stand between these women
and obtaining an abortion under medical care. The undocumented women in
the area would not be able to obtain an abortion under medical care unless they
were to risk deportation by traveling through the checkpoints, risk death by
attempting to circumvent them, or successfully obtain lawful presence in the
country before the point at which abortion becomes illegal.' In west Texas,
roughly four hundred twenty-five thousand women live in the largest
metropolitan area, in El Paso County." Closure of the El Paso clinics would
12. This estimate multiplies 2014 population and gender-ratio estimates for the counties of
Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr, Willacy, and Zapata and the city of Laredo, which gives a total of
822,448 women in that area; it is not limited to women of reproductive age. See State &
County QuickFacts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 1, 2015), http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html [http://perma.cc/RD39-S99C]; see also U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o9-824, BORDER PATROL: CHECKPOINTS CONTRIBUTE TO
BORDER PATROL'S MISSION, BUT MORE CONSISTENT DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 9 fig-3 (2oo9) (mapping checkpoints in the
southwestern United States).
13. Roughly 49,505 undocumented women of reproductive age live in the counties of Cameron,
Hidalgo, and Webb, combined. See Unauthorized Immigrant Population Profiles, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/us-immigration-policy
-program-data-hub/unauthorized-immigrant-population-profiles [http://perma.cc/L2BG
-EHH9] (providing estimates of the total number of unauthorized immigrants in these
counties and percentage breakdowns by gender and age range, using data from 2oo8 to
2013). In arriving at the estimates of undocumented women of reproductive age based on
this data, I multiplied the total figure for each county by the percentages of that population
estimated to be female and to be between ages sixteen and forty-four. (This estimate
necessarily assumes that gender distribution does not change with age; gender breakdown
by age for the undocumented population in these areas is not readily available.) Roughly
S.5% of the total Texas population is undocumented. See id. (estimating 1.464 million
undocumented immigrants in Texas); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 12 (estimating the
population of Texas in 2013 to be 26.505 million). Assuming that ratio for the counties of
Starr and Zapata, the two other counties within the border zone in the southern part of the
state, the total number of undocumented women of reproductive age in southern Texas's
border area is, very roughly, 50,706. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 12 (giving total
population and percentage breakdowns for gender and ages eighteen through sixty-four in
2014). The estimate for these two counties is necessarily rough. More than 5.5% of the
population in the other counties along the border is undocumented, see MIGRATION POL'Y
INST., supra, and the estimate includes a slightly different age range from that for the other
counties.
14. See infra Section I.A.
15. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 12 (estimate arrived at by multiplying the census
population and gender-ratio estimates for El Paso County). There are no major
metropolitan areas within the border zone between El Paso and the next closest city, Laredo,
and discerning how many people live within this area is more difficult due to the location of
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mean that the approximately twenty-four thousand undocumented women of
reproductive age living in that area would also need to cross a border
checkpoint in order to obtain an abortion in Texas.16 However, these
individuals can currently reach a clinic located south of border checkpoints in
New Mexico."
Whether H.B. 2 and the checkpoints create a constitutionally impermissible
barrier to abortion access remains significant for this group of women three
years after the statutory provisions became law. The Fifth Circuit has issued an
injunction partially limiting the law's effect by preserving access to the
McAllen clinic for undocumented immigrants living in some but not all of the
counties within the border zone in South Texas.'8 However, the injunction
terminates if a clinic opens closer to the Rio Grande Valley yet beyond the
checkpoints and its enjoinment of the admitting privileges requirement
extends only to a single, part-time doctor named in the opinion.'9 Because the
injunction is underinclusive with respect to undocumented women in the
border zone and may terminate, and because the limited relief may not prevent
the closure of the McAllen clinic, the separate question of the checkpoints'
import to H.B. 2's application to the clinics persists. If access to abortion rights
must be evaluated within the confines of one's state,' then the El Paso clinic
some checkpoints within border counties and the lack of available data on undocumented
populations in these counties. Consequently, undocumented persons living in this area
between Laredo and El Paso have been left out of these estimates.
16. See MTGRATTON POL'Y INST., supra note 13 (providing demographic data on the
undocumented population of El Paso County).
17. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 596 (5th Cir.) (noting the existence of the
clinic in southern New Mexico), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015),
and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
18. Id.
ig. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioners at 24, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274
(U.S. Dec. 28, 2015) (noting that the doctor is over retirement age and cannot perform
abortions full-time). The injunction has not gone into effect due to the stay of the Fifth
Circuit's ruling pending the Supreme Court's decision in the case. See Whole Woman's
Health v. Cole, 135 S. Ct. 2923, 2923 (2015). The limited nature of the injunction's relief is at
issue in the Whole Woman's Health case in its current posture before the Supreme Court,
though that case deals with health-related legislative justifications for H.B. 2 rather than any
undue burden posed by the unique nature of the border zone. See Brief for Petitioners,
supra, at 24 ("The limited relief provided to the McAllen clinic by the Fifth Circuit is likely
insufficient to permit the clinic to continue providing abortion services.").
2o. Compare Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2014),
petition for cert.filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997) ("[A] state cannot
lean on its sovereign neighbors to provide protection of its citizens' federal constitutional
rights."), with Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d at 597 (distinguishing]ackson in part
on the grounds that there are still abortion clinics open in Texas and in part on the fact-
specific circumstances ofthe El Paso clinic).
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poses constitutional concerns as well. From a theoretical perspective, the
broader question of how to think about potential barriers to vindication of
substantive due process rights posed by the conjunction of federal immigration
enforcement and state regulatory law remains open as well.
This Note identifies and explicates an overlooked constitutional problem
with H.B. 2, as applied to the border-zone clinics: in light of the backdrop of
federal immigration enforcement, the Texas law violates the reproductive
rights of more than eighty thousand women. In evaluating the potential rights
burden imposed on undocumented women in the border zone by H.B. 2, the
Note applies two analytical frameworks of constitutional law: the undue
burden analysis specific to substantive due process abortion jurisprudence and
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. The Note determines that H.B. 2
violates the reproductive rights of undocumented immigrants in the Texas
border area under either analysis. Part I characterizes the spatially selective
immigration enforcement regime that forms the backdrop to state legislation
and notes the omission of the spatially disparate effect of H.B. 2 from litigation
challenging the law. Under the undue burden framework, Part II argues, H.B.
2 has the effect of deterring undocumented women from seeking an abortion.
Under the unconstitutional-conditions framework, as Part III explicates, the
law violates undocumented women's abortion rights by conditioning abortion
access on exposure to immigration enforcement. The causal set that gives rise
to the rights burden is unusual: it is comprised of federal immigration
enforcement, state statutory provisions regulating abortion clinics, and
unauthorized immigrants' (lack of) immigration status. Part IV addresses an
important set of counterarguments: it argues that on either framework
analysis, and notwithstanding the other elements of the causal set, the state
legislation is causally responsible for the violation. This conclusion is both
doctrinally accurate and most consonant with constitutional commitments to
individual rights in the border zone.
This Note is the first work to analyze the implications of the confluence of
state laws with spatially disparate effects and internal checkpoints for the
fundamental rights of undocumented immigrants. This confluence highlights
the way in which the area along the U.S.-Mexico border inverts federalism
protections for a vulnerable minority group that can exercise neither exit nor
voice. It also provides one example of the significance of the undertheorized
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1. THE BORDER ZONE AND H.B. 2
A. Border Checkpoints: Spatially Selective Immigration Enforcement
The interior Border Patrol checkpoints create a system of spatially selective
immigration enforcement within the United States.' Individuals driving north
from the cities, towns, and ranches along the international border must,
eventually, stop at a roadblock set up along the highway.' Implementing
regulations interpret the "reasonable distance" contemplated in the federal
statute authorizing immigration searches as "within loo air miles from any
external boundary of the United States or any shorter distance" determined by
certain Department of Homeland Security officials.' At a checkpoint within
this "reasonable distance," a Border Patrol agent asks all occupants of the
vehicle if they are United States citizens.' The agent may then refer individuals
to secondary screening for further questioning as to their legal status in the
United States.' If the Border Patrol agent determines that there is probable
cause, individuals may be searched, detained, and, eventually, either charged
with a crime or entered into immigration removal proceedings.6 The Supreme
21. See U.S. Gov'TAccouNTABILHnY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2.
22. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12, at 6-11 (mapping checkpoints in the
southwestern United States); see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at
71, 78-79 (delineating checkpoints in the Laredo and Rio Grande Valley areas).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2015) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012)). A distance of over
one hundred air miles may also be deemed reasonable by certain agency heads. Id.
5 287.i(b). For an account of the authorizing statute, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying
text. At least one checkpoint has been noted roughly 125 miles from the (northern) border.
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, noth Cong. 7 (2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
24. See Cindy Casares, Border Patrol Takes 'No' for an Answer at Internal Checkpoints,
TEx. OBSERVER (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.texasobserver.org/border-patrol-takes-no-for
-an-answer-at-internal-checkpoints [http://perma.cc/LJP6-V2HA] (noting that Border
Patrol officers ask the questions "Are you a U.S. citizen?" and "Where are you headed?" at
interior checkpoints). At least in the mid-1970s, it was possible that those whom the Border
Patrol "recognize[d] as local inhabitants" would not be questioned. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 550 (1976) (describing this practice in southern Texas).
25. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-47.
z6. See id. at 567. A growing grassroots movement seeks to advance noncooperation at
checkpoints. See Casares, supra note 24. The Border Patrol has stated that, notwithstanding
refusals, vehicles "will not be allowed to proceed until the inspecting agent is satisfied that
the occupants ... are legally present in the U.S." Id. (quoting Border Patrol spokesperson).
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Court has upheld warrantless vehicle stops without particularized suspicion at
Border Patrol checkpoints against a Fourth Amendment challenge.7
Consequently, for those within the border zone, traveling into the interior
of the United States requires reckoning with this legal and physical architecture
of empire.8 In Texas, the border zone encompasses the cities of El Paso and
Laredo, the area of southern Texas called the Rio Grande Valley (including the
cities of McAllen and Brownsville), and the smaller towns and ranches that dot
the border. It is home to more than 2.4 million people in the state.9 The
Border Patrol maintains a web of "permanent" checkpoints -with physical
buildings, electronic sensors, and remote-surveillance capabilities-and
"tactical" checkpoints on secondary roads, which lack permanent physical
structures.30 Other than by passing through the highway checkpoints or
Border Patrol screening at one of the airports in the region, there is no practical
way out of the border zone and into northern Texas.3' In 2012, more than 120
people died trying to evade the Rio Grande Valley's eastern checkpoint by
walking through semiarid scrubland."
27. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62 (determining that Border Patrol checkpoint stops and
questioning are permissible without "individualized suspicion," due to the "reasonableness
of the procedures," the decreased expectation of privacy in a car, and the demonstrated
"need for this enforcement technique"). Martinez-Fuerte notes that checkpoint stops are
Fourth Amendment seizures. Id. at 556.
29. The distinction between metropole and periphery is a common one in imperial and colonial
studies. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 11 (1986). Scholars have applied this
conceptual framework to the "borderlands," identifying the United States border as a
peripheral site. See, e.g., Jost DAVID SALDivAR, BORDER MATrERS: REMAPPING AMERICAN
CULTURAL STUDIES, at xiii-xiv, 18 (1997). It is a distinction that federalism scholars draw on
as well, though not necessarily in explicit linkage with its use in imperial history. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2oo Term -Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARY. L. REV. 4, 25 (2010) (conceiving of federalism as the interaction between "the
center and its variegated periphery").
29. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 12. This figure sums up 2014 population estimates for
the counties of Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, Starr, Webb, Willacy, and Zapata.
3o. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note I, at 2, 1o, 16.
31. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12, at 9 fig.3 (mapping permanent
border checkpoints on major highways leading out of Texas's border zone); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 69-73, 78-81 (detailing Customs and Border
Protection enforcement in Laredo and the Rio Grande Valley); Fernandez, supra note 5
(describing undocumented immigrants' functional inability to leave the south Texas border
zone); Gamboa, supra note 6 (same).
32. Associated Press, Bodies Pile Up in Texas as Immigrants Adopt New Routes Over Border, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o9/23/us/bodies-pile-up-in-texas-as
-immigrants-adopt-new-routes-over-border.html [http://perma.cC/P772-HQB7]. There is
a limited legal avenue to leave the border zone while remaining in the United
States - parole - but due to the discretionary nature of the relief and the length of time
1752
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Figure 1.
BORDER PATROL PERMANENT CHECKPOINTS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
Courtesy of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Note that this map includes
only permanent, not tactical, checkpoints.
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involved in the application's adjudication, it is functionally not an option in the abortion
context. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012); infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
33 E.g., Philip Mayor, Note, Borderline Constitutionalism: Reconstructing and Deconstructing
judicial Justifications for Constitutional Distortion in the Border Region, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 647, 647 (2011) (characterizing the border area as an anomalous zone" under
Neuman's framework and noting distortions of typical doctrine in both the Fourth
Amendment and equal protection contexts, as well as the potential for perceived "threats to
sovereignty" to justify other distortions in constitutional doctrine that weighs governmental
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checkpoints and the international border make the area what Gerald Neuman
has called an "anomalous zone": a space "in which certain legal rules, otherwise
regarded as embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are
locally suspended."' In the border zone, these suspended rules include the
typical Fourth Amendment limitations on searches and seizures."s In areas in
Texas and other states on the southern border, Border Patrol agents require
only a reasonable suspicion that an individual is a noncitizen-not probable
cause- to effectuate a stop south of the checkpoints. And exiting this area and
reaching the rest of the state (and country) requires a warrantless seizure,
without particularized suspicion, at the checkpoint." The Supreme Court has
justified these deviations from ordinary Fourth Amendment restrictions by
explaining that the Border Patrol seeks to keep undocumented persons from
moving into the rest of the country, beyond the border zone."
But, as the Court has also recognized, the border zone is not just a place of
transit: it is also a place where many people live and work, and that many call
home.9 Justice Powell's majority opinion in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
upholding roving patrols near the border, noted that major cities, including
San Diego, El Paso, and the cities of the Rio Grande Valley, lie within the
border zone.4o In requiring reasonableness for stops in this area, Justice Powell
explained that the lack of such a requirement "would subject the residents of
these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
interests as part of a balancing test); see also, e.g., Cisar Cuauhtimoc Garcia Hernindez, La
Migra in the Mirror: Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 167, 180-87 (2009) (describing the exceptional
nature of immigration enforcement and doctrine permitting racial profiling in the border
zone, though not explicitly invoking the anomalous zone framework).
34. Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (1996).
s. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975) (describing the lower
"reasonable suspicion" standard for roving patrol stops of vehicles in the border zone, in
order to apprehend unauthorized immigrants); see also Garcia Hernindez, supra note 33;
Mayor, supra note 33.
36. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 884.
37. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
3s. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879 (describing Border Patrol checkpoints as "designed to
prevent . . . inland movement" of unauthorized immigrants); see also United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976) (explaining that interior checkpoints keep
highways from becoming "a quick and safe route into the interior").
39. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83 (requiring reasonable suspicion for roving patrol
stops in the border zone, in order to "protect[] residents of the border areas from
indiscriminate ... interference," and noting cities located within the border zone).
40. Id. at 882. The Court accepted the same statutory authorization as for the checkpoints (8
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highways."' The opinion expressed the view that while undocumented
immigrants use roads in the region to obtain "transportation . . . to inland
cities" -"seeking to enter the country illegally"- highways in the area
"carry .. . a large volume of legitimate traffic as well."' The next year, in
upholding brief seizures at fixed checkpoints, the Court explained that
the enforcement was part of a larger effort to "[i]nterdict the flow of
illegal entrants from Mexico" who "seek to travel inland" for employment
opportunities.'
As the conception of the border area in these opinions illustrates, courts do
not necessarily recognize and respond to the border zone as a site where not
just citizens and those with lawful immigration status but also undocumented
persons reside." The dichotomy depicted in the Fourth Amendment border-
area cases-between citizens and lawful permanent residents who live in the
border zone, on the one hand, and undocumented immigrants who pass
through the area in order to enter into the interior to obtain work-does not
capture the reality of the space. Estimates suggest that at least two hundred
fifteen thousand of those living in the border zone are unauthorized
immigrants - over seventy-five percent of whom have lived in the United
States for at least five years, and over fifty percent of whom have resided in the
country for at least ten years.45 These are not individuals treating the area as a
transient space.
The many undocumented persons living in southern Texas are therefore
subject to an enforcement regime that this Note calls, as a shorthand, "spatially
selective immigration enforcement." This enforcement is spatially selective in
that it involves specific questioning as to immigration status at the internal
checkpoints, for those who attempt to travel beyond the border zone.** Within
41. Id.
42. Id. at 879-82.
43. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. The repeated use of "inland" in these opinions resonates
with a sense of the border zone as on the periphery of continental empire. Cf supra note 28
and accompanying text.
44. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-83; United States v.
Jackson, 825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987). This conception is perhaps fueled by the checkpoint
cases' necessary focus on Fourth Amendment enforcement on highways -an inherently
transitory space.
45. See MIGRATION POL'Y INST., supra note 13 (collating data from surveys administered between
20o8 and 2013). The Migration Policy Institute provides figures broken down by county
only for the counties of Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, and Webb; this estimate therefore does
not include undocumented populations in the other, more rural counties in the border zone.
46. Estimates of the percentage of undocumented noncitizens not apprehended when passing
through checkpoints are not readily available. In fiscal year 2008, the Border Patrol reported
that close to seventeen thousand noncitizens were detained by the Border Patrol at
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the border zone, an encounter with the Border Patrol is not certain and
requires reasonable suspicion. It is an attempt to travel beyond the border zone
that leads to exposure to spatially selective immigration enforcement and its
attendant potential for deportation.47 The fact that many undocumented
immigrants remain in southern Texas for a decade or longer indicates that, by
staying within the border zone, individuals are able to remain within the
American community-but only within a spatially restricted part of that
community.4
Legal scholarship has highlighted the constitutional challenges posed by
"anomalous zones" more generally49 and by the border zone in particular.so
The border-area scholarship has primarily focused on the Fourth Amendment
issues engendered by the border and the related Supreme Court
jurisprudence.s" Scholars have also probed race-based immigration policing in
checkpoints for immigration violations. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12,
at 16. Undocumented immigrants living in south Texas report perceiving that risk as very
high. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
48. The border zone is therefore a site of underenforcement of federal immigration law. Cf
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1721 n.23 (20o6)
(describing sites of underenforcement as "anomalous zones"). This underenforcement is
consistent with broad underenforcement in the immigration context, given the choices that
the federal government must make in setting deportation priorities among the eleven
million unauthorized immigrants in the United States. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 152-53 (2015).
49. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 48, at 1721 & n.23; Neuman, supra note 34.
5o. See Garcia Hernindez, supra note 33; Mayor, supra note 33. Sociologists, too, have attended
to the way in which checkpoints create a "second border." See MIKE DAVIS, MAGICAL
URBANISM: LATINOs REINVENT THE U.S. BIG CITY 59 (2000); see also Guillermina Gina
Niifiez & Josiah McC. Heyman, Entrapment Processes and Immigrant Communities in a Time of
Heightened Border Vigilance, 66 HUM. ORG. 354, 354 (2007) (describing how "processes of
entrapment" along the U.S.-Mexico border "impose significant risk on movement of
undocumented people").
51. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 840 (2011) (explaining that, in the reasonableness framework that
Bernard Harcourt and Tracey Meares propose, the key question for the constitutionality of
checkpoints is "whether the hit rates at those checkpoints satisf[y] [a hypothetical]
minimum threshold to be established by the Court"); Mayor, supra note 33, at 672-73
(treating constitutional distortions in the Fourth Amendment context and noting broader
implications for equal protection and procedural due process); Paul S. Rosenzweig,
Comment, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sovereignty, and the Fourth Amendment, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1144 (1985) (arguing that "prior judicial scrutiny" of searches at interior
checkpoints is necessary to balance the protection of Fourth Amendment rights against "the
maintenance of territorial sovereignty").
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the border zone." Yet, the functional restriction on undocumented immigrants'
movement created by the checkpoints also implicates access to certain
substantive rights where exercise of those rights requires travel. Potential
ramifications of this anomalous zone for substantive due process rights remain
unexplored. Analyzing H.B. 2's effect on unauthorized immigrants' abortion
rights therefore provides a case study that illuminates the unique constitutional
conundrum posed by the checkpoints: spatially selective immigration
enforcement functionally bars movement out of the area, preventing
individuals from exercising their rights.
B. Reproductive Rights and Spatiality: H.B. 2
In the context of H.B. 2, the spatially selective nature of immigration
enforcement intersects with a spatial dimension to substantive due process-
specifically, here, to abortion access." Much recent abortion litigation has
centered on how the exercise of the right depends on the ability to travel and
spatial proximity to clinics. In particular, the passage of state laws aimed at
closing clinics has generated litigation regarding the undue burden posed by
increased travel time.' The Seventh Circuit's most recent opinion evaluating
52. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 129, 134-40 (2010); Garcia Hernindez, supra note 33, at 195-96.
53. This "spatial dimension" to or "spatial aspect" of substantive due process is slightly different
from the "spatial ... dimensions" of the doctrine in Justice Kennedy's discussion of spatial
zones of privacy and rights that go to personal autonomy in Lawrence v. Texas. See Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (describing substantive due process as "liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions"). The discussion of
substantive due process's spatiality in this Note identifies spatial access-a lack of spatial
barriers -as necessary in order to exercise substantive due process rights, including rights
that might be regarded as "involv[ing] liberty of the person . . in its more transcendent
dimensions." Cf id. This attention is consistent with that in other recent scholarship: Lisa
R. Pruitt and Marta R. Vanegas, for example, implicate the spatial nature of abortion access
in pointing out the "spatial privilege" of federal judges, located in urban centers, and the
need to be cognizant of the effects of state action with spatially unequal effects on
individuals in rural areas. See Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial
Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 79-
88 (2015).
s4. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 588-89 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed
pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015);
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott 111), 748 F.3d
583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796
(7th Cit. 2013); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1359 (M.D.
Ala. 2014); cf State Policies in Brief. Targeted Regulation ofAbortion Providers as of October i,
2o5, GutrMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibTRAP.pdf
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the effects of travel, in the context of a potential preliminary injunction,
included a map that charted out travel distance in concentric circles from a
town where a Planned Parenthood clinic would close if the law were not
enjoined.ss The potential closure of all abortion clinics in Mississippi implicated
the spatiality of abortion rights in a slightly different manner, raising the
question of whether a state must ensure access to a fundamental right within
its borders.ss H.B. 2, against the backdrop of the checkpoints, creates a third
variant of these spatial questions: whether the closure of clinics, requiring an
encounter with law enforcement in traveling to abortion clinics, violates the
reproductive rights of the group of people for whom that law enforcement is
relevant. Travel time raises questions in terms of spatial access as a sliding
scale; H.B. 2 and the checkpoints threaten to create, for a certain group, a de
facto bar to vindication of the right. The Mississippi regulations raise questions
about horizontal federalism; H.B. 2 and the border zone lead to questions
about rights vindication in the context of federal-state allocations of power in
anomalous zones.
The significance of the closure of abortion clinics in the border zone - and
deeper theoretical implications for understandings of federalism and individual
rights in the border zone - is also unexplored in legal scholarship. Scholars
have analyzed the significance of the Texas abortion restrictions in thinking
through legal disabilities experienced by Latinas living in southern Texas5' and
in analyzing the ways that courts fail to perceive rights barriers created by the
[http://perma.cc/V2TL-HGW7] (cataloguing the requirements placed on abortion facilities
and clinicians in various states).
ss. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 798.
56. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 2014) (requiring
Mississippi to ensure that there is no "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion in Mississippi" (emphasis added)), petition for cert. filed 83 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S.
Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997).
57. Madeline M. Gomez traces the effect of H.B. 2 on women in the Rio Grande Valley,
particularly undocumented women, to argue for "mov[ing] conversations about anti-
abortion regulations from the doctrinal realm of 'choice' and 'undue burden' into more
critical, intersectional discussions about . . . racial and gender dynamics . . . ." Madeline
M. Gomez, Intersections at the Border: Immigration Enforcement, Reproductive Oppression, and
the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 84, 88-90,
99-104, 113-18 (2015). Gomez identifies the checkpoints as an obstacle to vindication of
abortion rights for all Latinas living in the Rio Grande Valley, due to the possibility of
"overzealous enforcement," as one factor among many within a "matrix of domination." Id.
at 107-08. Gomez recounts litigation over H.B. 2 and describes abortion jurisprudence as a
"[d]octrinal [fjailure" that fails to account for larger effects on women's health and the
realities of factors limiting travel; unlike this Note, she does not doctrinally evaluate H.B. 2's
constitutionality or treat the checkpoints as a distinct and separate obstacle from other
restrictions on travel. See id. at 113-16.
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nature of rural areas.s8 Yet, while media reports have highlighted the major
hurdle that checkpoints could pose to undocumented women seeking an
abortion, scholarship has not separately explored this potential burden."
The doctrinal puzzle raised by H.B. 2 and the checkpoints - whether there
is in fact a violation of fundamental rights-has also been largely missing from
the litigation surrounding H.B. 2. In examining the law's effects, the two
challenges brought by reproductive-rights advocates have primarily focused on
the distance women must travel to access abortion clinics. In the first case,
Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit upheld H.B. 2's requirement that
doctors performing abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within
thirty miles, against, inter alia, a facial Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process challenge." At trial, a reproductive health clinic executive testified as to
the barrier that women with border-crossing cards-statuses for Mexican
nationals that restrict lawful presence to within a certain distance from the
border-would face in attempting to cross through internal checkpoints to
reach the nearest abortion clinic.6 ' A Fifth Circuit motions panel noted this
58. Lisa R. Pruitt and Marta R. Vanegas argue that opinions emerging from the litigation over
H.B. 2 reflect an urbanormativity in which federal judges living in urban areas err in
applying the undue burden standard because their understanding of legal geography is
clouded by spatial privilege. Pruitt &Vanegas, supra note 53.
s9. See, e.g., Cristina Costantini, For Undocumented Immigrants, It's Nearly Impossible To Get
an Abortion in South Texas, FUsION (Oct. 9, 2014, 12:57 PM), http://fusion.net/story
/2o689/for-undocumented-immigrants-its-nearly-impossible-to-get-an-abortion-in-south
-texas [http://perma.cc/H3ZM-4Y9QJ; Garcia-Ditta, supra note 9 ("Without clinics south
of the internal border immigration checkpoints . . . undocumented patients are virtually
trapped in south Texas."); Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of the DIY Abortion in Texas,
ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of
-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240 [http://perma.cc/GL2F-VLSR]; Thanh Tan, Checkpoints
Deter Illegal Immigrants Seeking Abortions, TEx. TRIB. (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www
.texastribune.org/2012/08/24/checkpoints-deter-noncitizens-seeking-abortions [http://
perma.cc/9P3X-MN6D].
6o. Abbott III, 748 F. 3d at 586-87. The plaintiffs also challenged the law's bar on the use of an
off-label protocol for certain abortifacients. Id. Abbott did find a violation of doctors'
procedural due process rights in the gap between the time the statutory provisions gave
doctors to secure admitting privileges (one hundred days) and the time it gave hospitals to
process doctors' applications (170 days). Id. at 6oo; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
241 (West 2015).
61. 2 Transcript of Bench Trial at 41, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott 1), 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 13-CV-0o862-LY)
("Even for people that have-that are there legally . . . [t]here's specific visas that people
have . .. to work in the valley .... [T] here is a checkpoint before Corpus [Christi], before
San Antonio that they wouldn't be able to pass."). A border-crossing card permits
Mexican citizens resident in Mexico to travel between the United States and Mexico but
requires that they remain within a certain radius of the border. 22 C.F.R. § 41.32
(2012); Border Crossing Card-Who Can Use It?, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
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testimony but determined in one sentence, "This obstacle is unrelated to the
hospital-admitting-privileges requirement.,6
The second challenge to H.B. 2, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, has
involved a facial and an as-applied challenge to the provision requiring
abortion facilities to meet the required standards for ambulatory surgical
centers and an as-applied challenge to the statute's hospital admitting
privileges requirement, for the McAllen and El Paso clinics.6 ' Discussion of
H.B. 2's effects in this litigation has also centered on travel distance: the Fifth
Circuit's ruling provided some relief as applied to the McAllen clinic because of
the undue burden created by travel time.'* The plaintiffs' trial brief and some
testimony from a witness for the plaintiffs at trial noted the barrier faced by
women with border-crossing cards.6s The district-court opinion listed
"immigration status and inability to pass border checkpoints" among eight
"practical" obstacles beyond travel distance that, together, indicated that the
statute created substantial obstacles for women.6 Neither the motions panel
nor the merits panel at the Fifth Circuit treated "immigration status" distinctly
or discussed the checkpoints. An amicus brief at the Supreme Court argues that
the law creates an undue burden for Latinas in Texas in part because of "[f]ear
PROTECTION (2015), http://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detaiVaid/1634/-/border-crossing
-card-documentation-requirements-for-mexican-citizens [http://perma.cc/MSM7-H6KU].
62. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott 11), 734 F.3d
406, 415 (5th Cir. 2013). The footnote accompanying this statement cited Fifth Circuit
precedent upholding the exclusion of abortion providers from limits under Louisiana's
Medical Malpractice Act, on the grounds that government "need not remove those obstacles,
like Louisiana's dearth of affordable insurance, that are not of the government's own
creation." Id. at 415 n.49 (citations omitted); K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 442 (5th Cir.
2013). The district court merits opinion, the Fifth Circuit merits opinion, and the opinion
denying rehearing and rehearing en banc did not discuss the issue of the checkpoints,
focusing instead on travel time and expense. See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott IV), 769 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying
rehearing and rehearing en banc); Abbott III, 748 F. 3d 583; Abbott 1, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891.
63. The case is currently docketed at the Supreme Court as No. 15-274. See also Whole Woman's
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.) (bearing the name of Texas's previous
commissioner of the Department of State Health Services), mandate stayed pending judgment
by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
64. Id. at 594.
6s. 2 Transcript of Bench Trial at 50-51, Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673
(W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 1:14-CV-284-LY); Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 30, Lakey, 46 F. Supp.
3d 673 (No. 1:14-CV-284-LY).
66. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 683. The other obstacles enumerated were "lack of availability of
child care, unreliability of transportation," poverty, travel time and expense, a lack of
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of immigration stops . . . near the Mexican border" when traveling, including
fear "of passing immigration checkpoints."17
The border checkpoints pose, though, an independent legal obstacle for
rights access in the border zone. Irrespective of travel-distance burdens, the
next three Parts argue, state legislation leading to clinic closure in the border
area gives rise to problems of rights access that make that legislation
constitutionally impermissible. Even if there were no travel-distance problems
and no other factors burdening abortion access - even if there were clinics just
on the other side of checkpoints located close to the border - state regulations
forcing clinics to shutter, such that immigration enforcement is physically
positioned between an undocumented individual and the locus of rights
vindication, would be unconstitutional.
II. H.B. 2 AS UNDUE BURDEN
H.B. 2 provides a case study of the relationship between a spatial
administrative enforcement regime that functionally bars travel for certain
individuals and access to substantive due process rights premised on a
presupposition of the ability to travel. Parts II and III analyze H.B. 2 as applied
to the clinics in southern and western Texas using two different doctrinal
methodologies: in Part II, the undue burden test first articulated in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,68 and in Part III, the transsubstantive unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Before reaching these two analytical frameworks, however, two
preliminary clarifications are necessary: one factual and the other legal.
First, this analysis starts from the factual point of departure that the means
for unauthorized immigrants to legally cross border checkpoints put forward
by Customs and Border Protection, parole in place, is not a realistic alternative
that enables vindication of the right to an abortion previability. Media report
that Customs and Border Protection has indicated that parole may be the
appropriate avenue for undocumented women in southern Texas seeking an
abortion.69 The executive branch has discretion to parole any applicant for
admission into the United States "for urgent humanitarian reasons or
67. Brief of National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 30-31, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016).
Oral argument at the Supreme Court addressed neither the checkpoints nor H.B. 2's effect
on undocumented women in the border zone. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hellerstedt,
No. 15-274 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2016).
68- 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69. Costantini, supra note 59 (describing the reporter's conversation with a Customs and Border
Protection spokesperson).
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significant public benefit."' This discretionary parole is available for those
already within the territory of the United States who entered without
inspection. It is less than clear that unauthorized immigrants trying to obtain
abortions who sought this discretionary relief would necessarily receive it.'
Even if they ultimately did receive relief, though, applications for humanitarian
parole "are generally adjudicated within 90-120 business days."' Unless one
were to apply for parole within two weeks of becoming pregnant, this time
frame would extend beyond the twenty-week limit on abortion in Texas
created by H.B. 2.
Second, noncitizens without legal immigration status who are within
the United States have substantive due process rights-as courts routinely
recognize.74 Though this point is well settled, because it is essential to
70. 8 U.S.C. § ii82(d)(5 )(A) (2012).
71. See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't ofJustice Office of the Gen. Counsel to Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. Officials (Aug. 21, 1998), in 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1050 app.
(1999). Those who have overstayed a visa or who are legally within the United States on a
border-crossing card are, seemingly, ineligible for parole, since they are not "applicants for
admission" within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. See id.; see also Cox &
Rodriguez, supra note 48, at 119 (2015) (analyzing the statutory rationale put forward by the
Executive for exercise of the parole power as relief for those already within the country).
72. See Costantini, supra note 59 (noting that Customs and Border Protection is unaware of
"how many women seeking abortions have ever used the program"); Memorandum from
the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of the Gen. Counsel to Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
Officials, supra note 71 (emphasizing the discretionary nature of parole). Recent executive
guidance states that, for those already within the United States, parole "is to be granted only
sparingly." U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Policy Memorandum, U.S. DEP'T
HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS
/Laws/Memoranda/2013/2013-1illSParole inPlace Memo_.pdf [http://perma.cc/LRP9
-RZMV]. Detailed statistics on parole grants, including parole-in-place grants, are
unavailable. See Donald Kerwin, Creating a More Responsive and Seamless Refugee Protection
System: The Scope, Promise and Limitations of US Temporary Protection Programs, 2 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 44, 53 (2014) (noting both the lack of publicly available
statistics on parole adjudications and that "neither CBP nor ICE produced parole statistics at
the author's request").
73. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Questions & Answers: Humanitarian Parole, U.S.
DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole
/questions-answers-humanitarian-parole [http://perma.cc/P6QL-65TL].
74. Unlike substantive due process rights, courts at times construe procedural due process rights
for noncitizens in removal proceedings as more restricted than such rights in other contexts,
due to the unique nature of federal power over the admission of immigrants. See STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 136-
216 (6th ed. 2015) (describing contestation over the extent of procedural due process rights
in removal proceedings); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996
Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1963, 1990-91 (2000) (explicating the relationship
between Congress's plenary power over the admission of immigrants and procedural due
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analyzing H.B. 2'S constitutionality as applied to border-zone clinics, it merits
explication. Textually, substantive due process's extension to all individuals
within the United States seems evident on the face of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' As the Supreme Court
stated in 1976 in Mathews v. Diaz, "The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose presence
in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection." 6 Since Diaz, both the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have evaluated whether state action violates unauthorized
immigrants' substantive due process rights without questioning whether the
Due Process Clause xtends to these individuals.' As one example, in a Ninth
Circuit en banc decision, both the majority and the dissent evaluated whether a
state statute barring the grant of bail to undocumented arrestees violated
substantive due process as a matter of course-without any question from
either side as to whether the Due Process Clause applied. As is widely
process and cautioning that it is not the case "that all constitutional limits evaporate in the
immigration context").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § a; cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend to undocumented persons because
"[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any
ordinary sense of that term").
76. 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
77. E.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 30-o6 (1993) (upholding an INS regulation authorizing
immigration detention of unaccompanied minors where certain "responsible adults" were
willing to undertake custody, using rational-basis review); Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F-3d 218,
239 (2d Cir. 2015) (determining that detained noncitizens without legal immigration status
could bring a substantive due process conditions of confinement claim); Aguilar v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enft Div. of the Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F. 3d 1, 18-24 (1st Cit.
2007) (dismissing undocumented immigrants' ubstantive due process claim but evaluating
whether the government had in fact violated the claimants' right to family integrity, without
evincing any doubt as to whether substantive due process protections extended to the
claimants); Buck v. Stankovic, 485 F. Supp. 2d 576, 582 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that an
undocumented immigrant in the United States possesses the fundamental right to marry);
Theck v. Warden, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that a noncitizen ordered deported has a fundamental right to marry); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-15 (determining that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applied to undocumented children,
relying in part on and explicating how the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments extend to undocumented immigrants).
78. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 781 (9 th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2046
(2015); id. at 803 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("Applying well-established substantive due
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accepted, undocumented persons have substantive due process rights - and
such rights encompass the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.79
A. Casey's Undue Burden Analysis
Evaluating H.B. 2 as applied to the border-zone clinics through the lens of
abortion-specific doctrinal analysis highlights the way in which the anomalous
zone in border states, created by federal administrative law and regulation, has
implications for state legislation with spatially disparate effects. Under the
substantive due process doctrine governing abortion, as delineated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,so the backdrop of spatially
selective federal immigration enforcement makes H.B. 2 unconstitutional as
applied to these clinics. Should the McAllen and El Paso clinics close, this
Section argues, undocumented women would experience a "substantial
obstacle" to exercising the fundamental right to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy. The clinic closures would have the effect of deterring them from
exercising that right, because they would have to pass through the internal
checkpoints to do so. Applying the logic of Casey-particularly as articulated in
its analysis of a state statutory provision requiring spousal notification, which
is closely analogous to this context - shows that H.B. 2 violates the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights of undocumented immigrants and
therefore is unconstitutional as applied to the border-zone clinics.
Substantive due process analysis of H.B. 2 in the border area requires the
use of the Casey framework.8' Under the "undue burden" standard of review
process principles to this record reveals that Proposition oo . . . survives substantive due
process review.").
79. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
So. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The interpretive framework in this Note relies extensively on common
law modes of interpretation, including reliance on past precedent, to interpret the open-
textured areas of the Constitution implicated by this puzzle. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The
Supreme Court 2014 Term-Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 22 (2015) (characterizing the constitutional system as a "mixed system" in which "the
text retains an ultimate authority" yet "constitutional law routinely proceeds without regard
to the text, in a common law-like fashion"). I do not seek to enter into a debate about
whether this mode of constitutional interpretation is best, but rather to apply existing lines
of constitutional doctrine within this interpretive framework.
St. Courts rely on the doctrine put forward in Casey in analyzing whether abortion restrictions
violate substantive due process, including in the context of laws leading to clinic closures.
E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015); Greenville
Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v.
Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156
(2007) ("Under the principles accepted as controlling here, the Act, as we have interpreted
it, would be unconstitutional [if it violated Casey's undue burden test)."); Stenberg v.
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established in Casey, a regulation is a constitutionally impermissible undue
burden on a woman's right to choose if it has either "the purpose or [the] effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a nonviable fetus."" While the litigation regarding H.B. 2 has centered on the
purpose analysis, in thinking about the intersection of border checkpoints and
state law, this aspect of the Casey previability test is less salient: there is little to
no evidence of any legislative intent to restrict access specifically for
undocumented women in the border zone.8' The key question is whether, as
applied to the clinics in the border zone, H.B. 2 is unconstitutional because it
has the "effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of' women
attempting to secure abortions, or whether the legislation is permissible. And,
to determine the answer to that question, it is essential to consider the effect of
clinic closures south of border checkpoints on a particular group of women -
unauthorized immigrants for whom the clinic closures create a de facto bar to
obtaining an abortion. Casey's spousal-notification analysis illustrates the
proper approach for assessing the burden created by clinic closures in southern
Texas because of the close analogy between three elements of the undue
burden analysis: (i) the relevant classes, (2) the burdens imposed on those
classes, and (3) the lack of relevance of a particular legal status (marital and
immigration, respectively).8
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000) ("Three established principles determine the issue before
us. We shall set them forth in the language of the joint opinion in Casey.").
82. 505 U.S. at 846.
83. The relationship between the purpose and the effects prongs of Casey, particularly in the
context of regulations premised on health justifications, is intertwined with the H.B. 2
litigation. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 44 (arguing that "[w]hether an obstacle
is substantial depends in part on the strength of a state's interest in imposing it"). The
doctrinal analysis of H.B. 2 as applied to border clinics in this Note does not depend on the
existence or strength of that relationship.
84. By contrast, Casey's determination regarding a mandated twenty-four hour waiting period
between an initial consultation with a physician and obtaining an abortion is neither
factually analogous nor particularly illuminating. The Casey joint opinion determined that
"on the record before us, and in the context of this facial challenge, we are not convinced
that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden," because "the District Court
did not conclude that the waiting period is [a substantial] obstacle even for the women
who are most burdened by it." Casey, 505 U.S. at 887. The district court had determined that
for particular groups of women- those with "the fewest financial resources"; those who
needed to "travel long distances" to reach a clinic; and "those who have difficulty explaining
their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others," the twenty-four hour waiting period
created "increased costs and potential delays." Id. at 886. However, the Casey joint opinion
explained in three terse sentences, particular burdens and substantial obstacles are not the
same, and the district court had not determined that the costs and delays reached the level of
a substantial obstacle. Id. at 887. The opinion does not explain what facts would have been
sufficient to demonstrate that the costs and delays were a "substantial obstacle." See id.
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In evaluating whether a statute or other state action has the effect of
creating a substantial obstacle, Casey explains, the relevant inquiry is not the
effect on all women but rather the effect on a subset of women to whom the
legal restriction matters.8, In Casey, the Court struck down the spousal-
notification provision in the Pennsylvania law at issue because it created a
"substantial obstacle" to obtaining an abortion for women who were at risk of
spousal abuse." The statute required that a married woman provide her
physician with a signed statement, affirming that she had informed her spouse
that she would be obtaining an abortion, before the procedure could be
performed.1 The woman could alternatively provide a signed statement
averring that she met one of the statutory exceptions to the requirement.8
However, those exceptions did not cover all conditions of spousal abuse, nor
Because of this failure to explain what would have sufficed, and because the Court
apparently viewed the failure to satisfy an undue burden standard in this instance as in part
grounded in an underdeveloped record, the twenty-four hour waiting period analysis is
rather unhelpful to subsequent efforts to discern the contours of an undue burden. This
Note does not utilize Casey's discussion of the waiting period in the analysis of border
checkpoints and H.B. 2 for two reasons. First, with respect to the waiting period, the Casey
Court did not engage in any analysis beyond faulting the district court's record
development- there is neither explication of the legal standard nor robust precedential
argument to which analogy is possible. Second, the Court's holding that the "particular
burden" of "increased costs and potential delays" did not on the record constitute a
"substantial obstacle" for the particular groups of women affected seems to implicate some
sort of sliding-scale analysis-degrees of cost and delay-rather than the but-for bar
implicated by both the spousal-notification requirement and the need to cross border
checkpoints.
Subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has not analyzed, under the effects prong of
the Casey test, situations in which the potential obstacle gives rise to a but-for bar to
women's access to abortion. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld a ban on a particular
procedure due to what it characterized as the continued availability of "standard medical
options . . . that are considered to be safe alternatives." 550 U.S. at 166-67. Stenberg v.
Carhart struck down criminal sanctions on physicians' use of particular abortion procedures.
530 U.S. at 945-46. Neither of these cases analyzes the effects prong in depth or does so in
an analogous context, involving a bar on access - but-for or otherwise - for either women in
general or a subset of women. Rather, they involve restrictions on particular medical
procedures. Consequently, these cases are not analytically instructive in the H.B. 2 context.
85. 505 U.S. at 894.
86. Id. at 887.
87. Id.
88. Under the statute, a signed statement that a woman had informed her spouse was not
required where she instead indicated in a signed statement that she could not find her
spouse; that her spouse was biologically unrelated to the fetus; that her pregnancy was due
to spousal sexual assault and that she had reported the assault; or that she believed that
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did they cover situations in which a woman otherwise would not have chosen
to notify her spouse due to "the husband's illness, concern about her own
health, the imminent failure of the marriage, or the husband's absolute
opposition to the abortion.""
The State of Pennsylvania argued that, in determining whether the statute
had the effect of creating a substantial obstacle, the key question was the
percentage of women who sought an abortion who would be affected by the
law.9 o The Casey opinion, though, explained that this approach was incorrect.
Rather, the scope of the inquiry properly focused on "the group for whom the
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant" -the key
question was, out of the group affected by the law, whether in "a large fraction
of cases" the statutory provision gave rise to a substantial obstacle.92 It was
only once the group "of women upon whom the statute operates" or, in other
words, "those whose conduct [the legislation] affects" was determined that a
court could then determine whether the imposed burden was undue.9 3 For the
spousal-notification requirement, the scope of the undue burden inquiry was
not all women in Pennsylvania or even all married women seeking abortions.94
For most married women, the Court explained, the statute would not change
their behavior, because "[i]n well-functioning marriages, spouses discuss
important intimate decisions."95 Consequently, in ascertaining whether the
spousal-notification requirement posed an undue burden, the inquiry as to
potential burden was limited to "married women seeking abortions who do not
wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for
one of the exceptions to the notice requirement.",6
Similarly, in determining whether the statutory provisions compelling the
closure of the McAllen and El Paso clinics are constitutionally permissible, one
does not evaluate the effect of the closures on all women in Texas, all women in
8g. Id. at 888 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1361 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), afd in part, rev'd in part, 505
U.S. 833 (1992)).




94. See id. at 894-95 ("The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the
law is a restriction . . . . By selecting as the controlling class women who wish to
obtain abortions, rather than all women or all pregnant women, respondents in effect
concede that § 3209 must be judged by reference to those for whom it is an actual rather
than an irrelevant restriction.").
95. Id. at 892-93.
96. Id. at 895.
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those cities, or all women in the border zone. Rather, the scope of the inquiry
focuses on "the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant."97 Following Casey, federal courts have applied
Casey's limited-inquiry approach in the context of clinic closures.9' In
evaluating the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction of admitting
privileges requirements in Wisconsin that would lead to clinic closures, for
example, a district court explained that the scope of the relevant inquiry was
"women seeking abortions who are impacted by the closure of [two clinics],
and the reduction of capacity of [a third] clinic. The question is what
percentage of those women will be substantially impacted."99 Similarly, in
evaluating the closure of the clinics in the border zone, the appropriate focus is
the group of women seeking abortions "for whom the law is a restriction" -the
group that experiences some sort of burden due to the law, whether due to
travel time or the need to pass through border checkpoints.'oo Once the group
97. Id. at 894. The idea that choice architecture ought to focus on "the preferences of the
subgroup of decision makers whose choices are affected by the nudge" perhaps provides an
apposite analogy. Cf Jacob Goldin, Which Way To Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the
Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (2015).
gs. E.g., Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F- 3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e
nevertheless conclude in this case that the record provides no evidence from which to
conclude that Regulation 61-12 would present a 'substantial obstacle.' The record contains
evidence from several abortion providers, only one of which would be adversely affected in
any significant way . . .. Moreover, even for women [in that provider's town], no evidence
suggests that they could not go to the clinic in Charleston, some 70 miles away . . . .");
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2013)
("[N]or can a serious burden be ignored because some women of means may be able to
surmount this obstacle while poorer women (who constitute a majority of the plaintiffs'
patients and thus a 'large fraction' of those affected by this law) cannot.").
99. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013 WL 3989238, at
*16 n.30 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2), affd, 738 F-3d 786 ( 7th Cir. 2013).
oo. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
(enumerating barriers to access with clinic closures due to increased travel time, checkpoints
and immigration status, poverty, and other obstacles), affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), mandate stayed
pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey seems to have misunderstood
Casey's scope of analysis. The Fifth Circuit explained, "[W]e used all women of reproductive
age or women who might seek an abortion as the denominator," since "H.B. 2 applies to all
abortion providers and facilities in Texas." Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563,
589 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015). The Casey Court made clear, though, that a controlling class is
certainly narrower than "all women of reproductive age." See Casey, S05 U.S. at 894-95
(noting that the respondents implicitly understood, by drawing the class as "women who
wish to obtain abortions," that the scope of the class at issue was narrower than "all women"
and then drawing the class yet more narrowly).
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that experiences some sort of burden is ascertained, the effects analysis asks
whether, for a "significant number" or "large fraction" of the group who
experiences some sort of effect, the burden is undue."o' The Casey Court
determined that Pennsylvania's spousal-notification requirement was invalid
because, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the statutory provision was]
relevant, it . . . operate[d] as a substantial obstacle."o2 This "large fraction"
language has been the subject of attempts at judicial line drawing since
Casey.103 Casey itself, though, did not give any precise ratio or number - there
was no calculation in the opinion as to the percentage or absolute number of
women who experienced an undue burden from the spousal-notification
requirement. 104 As noted above, Casey quoted the district court's findings as to
a number of circumstances in which the spousal-notification requirement
might change women's behavior-most significantly, in spousal-abuse
situations, but also in instances where the marriage was disintegrating, the
spouse was ill or opposed to abortion, or the woman was concerned with her
own health.'o In determining that spousal abuse meant that, in a "large
fraction" of cases, the law gave rise to an undue burden, Casey did not estimate
the numerical ratio of spousal abuse versus the other situations it delineated. 16
Rather, it reasoned that women who were subject to potential domestic abuse
were "likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion," that there were many
such women in the United States ("millions"), and that, consequently, in a
"large fraction" of the relevant cases, where behavior might change, the law
created a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion."o'
The nature of this effects analysis -looking to some subset of the burdened
population for whom the burden may be undue -is what makes the interior
checkpoints so salient to analysis of the potential clinic closures in the border
zone. For undocumented women, closure of the McAllen and El Paso clinics-
101. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95.
102. Id. at 895.
103. E.g., Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 372-74 (6th Cir. 20o6) (defining
a large fraction as "something more than the 12 out of 1oo women identified here"); Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1462-63 (8th Cir. 1995) (determining
that affidavits as to the inability of abused minors to use an abuse exception and studies
showing the ability for parent-child relationships to become abusive indicated that "a large
fraction of minors seeking pre-viability abortions would be unduly burdened by South
Dakota's parental-notice statute"). But see Abbott III, 748 F. 3d at 588-89 (doubting whether
the large-fraction test applied at all in the context of facial invalidation).
104. So5 U.S. at 894-96.
ios. Id. at 888.
106. Id. at 894-96.
107. Id. at 894-95.
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of the clinics south and west of checkpoints - means that they are "likely to be
deterred from procuring an abortion," as those at risk of spousal abuse were
likely to be deterred under the Pennsylvania provision at issue in Casey.
Crossing border checkpoints to obtain an abortion risks detention and
deportation, including the possibility of permanent separation from family
members in the United States."os As was apparently true for those subject to
spousal abuse in Casey, there appears to be no readily available empirical
evidence on the precise effect of this choice on women's actions or the number
or percentage of undocumented women seeking an abortion in the border
zone who will be deterred from doing so.'o9 As in the case of those at risk
of spousal abuse, unauthorized immigrants are not easily identifiable and
likely reluctant to come forward for such research. Nevertheless, the high
stakes for undocumented women in crossing checkpoints, coupled with
anecdotal evidence that the checkpoints do function as a deterrent,' indicate
that-like those deterred by spousal abuse in Casey- undocumented women
who would otherwise obtain an abortion are, if the clinics close, likely to be
deterred from doing so.
For undocumented immigrants seeking abortions in light of possible
clinic closures and the background reality of internal immigration checkpoints,
the analogy to the spousal-notification requirement in Casey and its effect
on potential spousal abuse victims is particularly apt. Just as, in Casey, the
background reality of a condition in certain women's lives meant that a new
statutory burden made such women "likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion,"" the background reality of the border checkpoints means that a
significant number of the women living in southern Texas without legal status
will probably be deterred from obtaining an abortion. Casey noted that those in
abusive situations "may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their
husbands," including possible abuse of themselves or their children and their
spouses' ability to leverage potential disparities in economic power. Similarly,
the consequences of removal from the United States are potentially enormous;
undocumented women may also "have very good reasons" for avoiding contact
with internal border checkpoints.
The parallel between the two statuses is especially appropriate in that,
just as married women "do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty""'
1os. See infra Section II.B.
iog. See SoS U.S. at 888-96; cf Tan, supra note 59 (noting the difficulty of determining the
number of undocumented immigrants seeking second-trimester abortions).
1o. See sources cited supra note 59.
M. 505 U.S. at 894.
12. Id. at 898.
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because of their legal status, neither do undocumented women. Governmental
action on behalf of the underlying legal regime related to a woman's status -
whether that be marital status and regulation of marriage or immigration
status and regulation of immigration -may not, Casey indicates, be a means of
depriving women of their fundamental rights, where they maintain those
rights regardless of that legal status. While this point is certainly not essential
to the large-fraction analysis, it suggests the particular aptness of the analogy
to the spousal-notification requirement.
If the analogy to Casey is relatively straightforward, though, what should
we make of the Fifth Circuit's brief analysis of the issue, which quickly
discarded the "obstacle" of border checkpoints as "unrelated to the hospital-
admitting-privileges requirement"?"' This determination reflects-in addition
to a lack of record information on the point 4 -an erroneous understanding of
Casey, relying too much on language in the selective-funding case Harris v.
McRae"s without considering Casey's later analysis." It fails to recognize that
Harris's language that the government "may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, [but] it need not remove those not
of its own creation""7 is at odds with Casey, unless read in the broader context
of the selective-funding cases. Abusive spouses are not the creation of
the government, yet Casey found that where their actions combined with
Pennsylvania's spousal-notification requirement, the burden was undue."'
Harris, in determining that the availability of federal Medicaid funds for
pregnancy-related expenses but not for abortion was constitutionally
permissible, decided that such funds' availability "leaves an indigent woman
with at least the same range of choice" as to whether to obtain an abortion;"'
the spousal-notification requirement in Casey and the closure of clinics south of
113. See Abbott II, 734 F.3d at 415.
114. See supra notes 6o-62 and accompanying text (detailing the scarce record evidence as to
border checkpoints in the Abbott litigation).
IS. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 415 n.49 (citing K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F. 3d 427,
442 (5th Cir. 2013)).
116. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167-68 (2007) (confirming the continued relevance of
"large fraction of relevant cases" analysis); see also supra notes 92-96 (discussing this aspect
of the Casey analysis).
117. See 448 U.S. at 316.
118. Both Casey and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions demonstrate that an "unrelated"
obstacle may play a role in undue burden analysis. As Part III of this Note argues, that lack
of relatedness is precisely what makes the combination of the causal events creating an
undue burden constitutionally impermissible.
11g. 448 U.S. at 317.
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border checkpoints, by contrast, restrict choice by removing access, such that
the option of abortion is functionally unavailable.
H.B. 2 creates a substantial obstacle for a "significant number" or "large
fraction" of the women for whom the law is relevant: the undocumented
immigrants for whom the clinic closures impose a virtually per se bar to
obtaining an abortion. The numbers here cannot be obtained with precision,
but Casey indicates that they need not be. The closure of clinics in the
border zone creates obstacles for those seeking an abortion, due to increased
travel distance.120 That group of individuals -those burdened by distance-is
analogous to the group of women in Casey who might have wished not to
notify their spouse for reasons unrelated to domestic violence. Casey did
not attempt to calculate this group's precise number, or to compare it
mathematically to the number for whom the provision was a de facto per se
bar due to spousal abuse. Consequently, under Casey, it is not necessary to
determine the exact number of undocumented women i  Texas's border zone.
Rather, the point is that undocumented immigrants in southern Texas who are
burdened by the clinic closures -whether that group is framed as a "large
fraction" or a "significant number" of those burdened by the closures-
experience the burden on their right to abortion as a virtual bar.
There are likely more than eighty thousand undocumented women of
reproductive age in Texas's border zone. Just as the Casey court was able to
infer from the high number of women who are subject to spousal abuse in the
United States that a "large fraction" of those who would not otherwise inform
their spouses belonged to this group, in the H.B. 2 context we can infer that a
"large fraction" of those affected by the clinic closures in the border zone are
undocumented immigrants who now may be functionally unable to obtain an
abortion.
B. Immigration Enforcement as Obstacle
A potential objection to this doctrinal understanding of the burden posed
by immigration checkpoints is the nature of the obstacle: one might say that
immigration enforcement is no obstacle to rights vindication in this context at
all, due to the availability of abortion in immigration detention. Federal
immigration-detention standards provide that "[a] pregnant detainee in
custody shall have access to pregnancy services including. . . abortion services"
12o. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014), affd in
part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F-3d 563 (Sth
Cir. 2015), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
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and that every place of detention "shall . . . provide its female detainees with
access to" abortion." Either undocumented women will not be detained at a
checkpoint and will continue driving until they reach an abortion clinic, or they
will be detained and may avail themselves of access to abortion care while
detained. Consequently, the objection might run, undocumented women in the
Rio Grande Valley and El Paso face unfortunate circumstances, but there is no
absolute bar to abortion access: either outcome could end in exercise of the
right. How could there be any rights pressure, then-let alone an undue
burden? Evaluating the nature of immigration enforcement as an obstacle
implicates the functional nature of undue burden analysis, which takes into
account not whether there is some possible avenue to rights vindication but
rather the probability of deterrence due to cost-benefit analysis associated with
the barrier to vindication of the right.
The key question in evaluating whether state action gives rise to an
undue burden under Casey's effects prong is whether the action "impose[s]
a substantial obstacle," such that individuals are "likely to be deterred
from procuring an abortion."'" Casey explained that because those subject to
potential spousal abuse were likely to weigh the cost-benefit analysis and
not notify their spouses, out of "fear for their safety and the safety of
their children," the requirement meant they were "likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed
abortion in all cases.""' Formally, women in this situation could tell their
spouses, potentially incur abuse, and obtain abortions; functionally, the Court
recognized, the potential cost of doing so was so great that these women were
"likely to be deterred"-likely to choose not to vindicate the abortion right.'4
Similarly, the rights burden created in this situation by H.B. 2 is not
because there is no possible way for an unauthorized immigrant living in
southern Texas to vindicate her right to obtain an abortion. Instead, the
rights burden exists because, due to both the perceived very high risk of
detention and deportation in passing through checkpoints' and the
magnitude of the repercussions of detention and deportation, undocumented
women are "likely to be deterred" from obtaining an abortion at all. Removal
from the United States can be personally catastrophic: an individual is
121. Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT 304-05 (2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2onl/pbnds
20i.pdf [http://perma.cc/UB3L-6BMF].
122. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94 (1992).
123. Id. at 894.
124. Id. at 893-95.
125. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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separated, perhaps permanently, ,6 from her home, her family, her community,
and her work-in short, from the life that she has created for herself.'" Those
in families of mixed citizenship and immigration statuses face an especially
wrenching choice: to uproot everyone, potentially moving to a country where
some or all family members do not have ties or even speak the predominant
language, or to leave some family members behind for an indefinite period of
time.`8 The Supreme Court has described deportation as "the equivalent of
banishment or exile."" It has recognized that deportation may cause the "loss
of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living."' When a
woman may obtain an abortion only by placing herself at risk of losing "all that
makes life worth living," it is reasonable to surmise that many women who
would otherwise choose to terminate that pregnancy will not do so.
Moreover, even beyond the enormous harm of deportation, the probability
of losing one's liberty"' by being placed in immigration detention is likely
126. A noncitizen who is ordered removed, or one who is unlawfully present in the United States
for more than one year and then departs voluntarily, is typically ineligible to reenter the
United States for ten years. 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(a)(9) (2012). Moreover, even if this restriction is
lifted, individuals seeking to reenter are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility for
noncitizens, which may be disqualifying from any subsequent reentry. See id. 5 1182(a).
Waivers of some inadmissibility grounds, at the discretion of executive-branch officials, may
be available. See, e.g., id. § x82(g)(1), (h).
127. See, e.g., Gonzalez Recinas, 23 1. & N. Dec. 467, 471-73 (B.I.A. 2002) (describing hardships
faced by noncitizens upon deportation, in evaluating eligibility for cancellation of removal);
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63-65 (B.I.A. 2001) (cataloguing "extreme" hardship
faced by the respondent, which nevertheless did not rise to the level necessary for relief from
removal, including school-age U.S. citizen children being required to relocate to Mexico and
consequently "likely . . . hav[ing] fewer opportunities," loss of employment, loss of
community after living in the United States for twenty years, and separation from parents
and siblings living in the United States). The burden may be particularly acute for those
who were brought to the United States as young children and who have little or no
connection to or memory of their country of origin. Cf Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
472-73 (describing the potential difficulties faced by a family lacking a support network in
Mexico).
128. See, e.g., Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321-22 (B.I.A. 2002); Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 1. &
N. Dec. at 57.
12g. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S.
388, 390-91 (1947))-
130. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Ng Fung Ho made this point in the context
of the deportation of an individual claiming citizenship. Fiswick v. United States applied this
language to the deportation of noncitizens. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 n.8
(1946).
131. Entering into immigration detention involves not only losing liberty but also losing privacy
along a different dimension, in the form of intrusive health examinations for all pregnant
women. While, outside of detention, a woman deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy
may choose to refuse medical care at any point, those identified in immigration detention as
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to function as a deterrent in traveling through the checkpoints for abortion
purposes.' Even for those without legal status who are not ultimately
deported, because they are granted a form of affirmative relief-asylum or
withholding of removal-the process for receiving affirmative relief may take
years, and if the immigration judge determines that they are a flight risk
or a danger to the community, they may spend those years in detention.'
Federal courts have recognized that, for sentencing purposes, time spent
in immigration detention either may be equivalent to time spent in prison3 4 or
may qualify a convicted individual for a downward departure in sentencing.135
When weighing, in combination, the threat of removal and the hazard of
detention in passing through internal checkpoints, a "significant number" of
women without legal status are "likely to be deterred."'6 Even if potential
detention is not an absolute bar to abortion, for many women the utility
analysis of the magnitude and probability of harm from being detained
and likely deported will itself function as a bar. Under the current doctrinal
analysis for violations of the substantive due process right to choose whether
to terminate a pregnancy, undocumented women - a "relevant fraction" of
the population affected by H.B. 2's admitting privileges and ambulatory
surgical center requirements - experience an undue burden. This specific
doctrinal analysis demonstrates how, taking into account the backdrop of
federal checkpoints, state legislation may burden rights in the border zone.
pregnant "shall" receive "an initial health appraisal ... includ[ing] a thorough evaluation
and assessment of the reproductive system" within twenty-four hours of being detained.
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, supra note 121, at 3o5-o6.
132. See Tan, supra note 59 (discussing women's unwillingness to risk crossing checkpoints).
133. See, e.g., Christie Thompson, The Long and Winding Detainment of Diana Ramos,
MARSHALL PROJECT, http://www.themarshallproject.org/2ol5/o5/o8/the-long-and-winding
-detainment-of-diana-ramos [http://perma.ccEgZL-XPNE] (describing the detention for
over four years of an undocumented woman seeking relief from removal); see also 8 U.S.C. S
1226(a), (c) (2012) (establishing the criteria for discretionary and mandatory detention
during removal proceedings).
134. See, e.g., Zavala v. Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 380 (9th Cir. 2015).
135. United States v. Estrada-Mederos, 784 F.3d io86, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that
"uncredited confinement" in immigration detention could potentially serve as grounds for a
downward departure from the sentencing guidelines); United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163
F. 3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); cf Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 11o
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) ("For many noncitizens, detention now represents a
deprivation as severe as removal itself.").
136. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-99 (1992).
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III. H.B. 2 AND BORDER CHECKPOINTS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITION
In the specific doctrinal context of abortion jurisprudence, then, H.B. 2 as
applied to the border zone violates the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process guarantee because it has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle
for undocumented women. Another means of thinking of the harm of H.B. 2
for undocumented women in the border zone, though, is not merely through
the ramifications of the legislation -the functional inability to access abortion
services - but, more broadly, as creating a choice that is constitutionally
suspect: a choice between exercising one's fundamental right and avoiding
exposure to immigration enforcement. Thus, another way to conceive of
the problem- ultimately arriving at the same conclusion, but with an
analysis generalizable to rights burdenings beyond the abortion context-is
through the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Framing the problem in
more general terms and examining H.B. 2 on these grounds demonstrates the
way that state legislation with spatially disparate effects may, more generally,
create constitutional problems given the reality of internal checkpoints.
Such legislation gives rise to unconstitutional conditions that impermissibly
pressure rights. The key insight of this Part is that we ought to conceive of
barriers to access engendered by the confluence of spatially disparate state
legislation and federal internal immigration checkpoints as an
unconstitutional-conditions problem.
Evaluating the problem through the lens of unconstitutional conditions
provides a separate ground for H.B. 2's unconstitutionality, independent of the
Casey analysis. Whether undocumented women are in fact deterred from
seeking an abortion by the closure of all clinics south of border checkpoints is
not the relevant inquiry under unconstitutional-conditions doctrine -instead,
the question is whether women must choose between a discretionary benefit
and the exercise of a constitutional right."' The de facto requirement created
137. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 (1989) ("[A proffered governmental] 'exchange' [in an
unconstitutional-conditions problem] has two components: the conditioned government
benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other.... [A]llocation of
the benefit would normally be subject to deferential review, while imposition of a burden on
the constitutional right would normally be strictly scrutinized. Which sort of review should
apply? The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions says the latter."). Even in the absence of
empirical data as to which choice undocumented women make -as to whether they choose
detention, deportation, and abortion, or remain in their homes and carry a pregnancy to
term.- unconstitutional-conditions doctrine provides a means to evaluate whether the
requirement that they make that choice at all is constitutionally permissible.
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by Texas law that a woman without legal status must pass through an internal
Border Patrol checkpoint to reach abortion services creates an unconstitutional
condition on the exercise of the fundamental right, because of the coercive
nature of the choice. Such an unconstitutional condition is a violation of a
woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.
This mode of analysis indicates that the situation that H.B. 2 creates for
undocumented women in southern Texas is one instantiation of a larger
problem: the way that the conjunction of internal checkpoints and state
legislation with spatially disparate effects on access to rights may create a
constitutionally impermissible choice for undocumented individuals. This
insight - that unconstitutional-conditions doctrine provides an alternative
means of evaluating the problem-and the subsequent evaluation require
further interrogation. This Part's analysis turns first to the nature of the benefit
at stake, then to an evaluation of whether there is sufficient germaneness for an
unconstitutional condition, and finally to the additional complication of the
multiple state actors who together give rise to the condition.
The functional requirement that an individual choose between exercising a
fundamental right - in this case, the right to obtain an abortion - and forgoing
questioning by Border Patrol officers as to one's immigration status implicates
this transsubstantive doctrine. The underlying idea of unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine is, essentially, that the government cannot create an
impermissibly rights-pressuring choice.'" As the Supreme Court recently
explained in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, in the
individual-rights context the doctrine bars "the government [from] deny[ing]
a benefit to a person because he [or she] exercises a constitutional right."39
For example, a state may not make public employment contingent on an
individual's giving up her right to free speech.4 Such a choice is
impermissible even if the benefit is not one to which the person has a "right ...
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
138. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (20o6) ("[T]he
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit." (quoting
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003))); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1415 (also making this point).
139. 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545
(1983)); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 ("[T]he government may not require a person to give
up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the [right at issue].").
140. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98.
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reasons."" Moreover, it is impermissible regardless of what the individual
ultimately chooses -whether she opts to pass up the benefit or instead to forgo
exercise of the right." Recent takings cases have required a "nexus" and
"rough proportionality" between the relinquishment of the rights exercise and
the granting of the benefit.43
Originally applied in the context of economic substantive due process,4
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine-or, as it is sometimes termed, the
conditional-offer problem s -applies to a situation in which the exercise of an
individual constitutional right is conditioned. Apparently not limited to any
particular subset or constellation of rights, the doctrine is a "multi-function
doctrine" 6 useful in evaluating situations in which state action leads to a
situation that conditions rights on forgoing a benefit, or vice versa. The
Supreme Court has used unconstitutional-conditions analysis to evaluate
claims that state action violates freedom of speech,4 ' free exercise of religion, 5
the right to refrain from self-incrimination," the right to travel,' and the
141. Id. ("We have applied the principle regardless of the public employee's contractual or other
claim to a job. . . . Thus, the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-
employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial."); see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at
2596.
i42. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (noting that a biconditional may be constitutionally impermissible
"regardless of whether the government ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into
forfeiting a constitutional right").
143. Id. at 2591; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383, 395.
144. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1307 (1984). Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of
California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), which struck down a California requirement that a private
carrier take on the duties of a common carrier in order to use state highways, is frequently
regarded as one of the seminal cases on unconstitutional conditions - if not the seminal case.
See Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1428-30.
145. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2001).
146. Samuel L. Bray, On Doctrines That Do Many Things, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 142 (2015).
147. See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324, 2330-32
(2013); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
148. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (finding that a South Carolina
statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on an individual's free exercise of religion by
withholding unemployment benefits from those who could not work on Saturday due to
religious reasons).
149. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (finding that giving police officers a
choice between self-incrimination and losing their jobs constituted a constitutionally
impermissible coercion because "[t]here are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a
State may not condition by the exaction of a price").
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Takings Clause."' Federal courts of appeals have recognized the applicability of
unconstitutional-conditions analysis to claims of violations of freedom of
speech, petition, assembly, and association;"s2 the Establishment Clause;53
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure;'54 the Takings Clause;55 the
150. See, e.g., Mem'1 Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) ("The Arizona
durational residence requirement for eligibility for nonemergency free medical care creates
an 'invidious classification' that impinges on the right of interstate travel by denying
newcomers 'basic necessities of life."'); see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (characterizing Memorial Hospital as an unconstitutional-
conditions case).
151. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 841-42
(1987) (finding that the respondent's permit condition violated the Takings Clause); see also
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (explaining that Nollan held that the
government cannot require a person to give up a constitutional right "to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use" in exchange for a benefit that has
little to no relationship to the property).
152. See, e.g., Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F-3d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding a viable First
Amendment unconstitutional-conditions claim where plaintiffs alleged "that the
government ha[d] conditioned their eligibility for the valuable benefit of [advisory-
committee] membership on their willingness to limit their First Amendment right to
petition government"); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F-3d 1303, 1325 (iith Cir. 2004) (holding
unconstitutional the conditioning of the rights to freedom of speech and assembly on
submitting to an unreasonable search); Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2000)
(overturning state refusal to permit the Ku Klux Klan to participate in the Adopt-A-
Highway program in part because "[t]he State simply cannot condition participation in its
highway adoption program on the manner in which a group exercises its constitutionally
protected freedom of association"); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. SYS., 476 F.2d 92, 96-97
(loth Cit. 1973) (holding that the state cannot condition continued public employment on
limiting speech).
153. See, e.g., Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 450 F- 3d 863, 866-68, 874-75 (9 th Cir. 2005) (finding
that imposing searches and drug testing as conditions of pretrial release constitutes
an unconstitutional condition without probable cause); Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942,
947-48 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[A] general conditioning of prison visitation on subjection to a
strip search is manifestly unreasonable.").
15s. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 47 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Massachusetts cannot
condition the right to sell tobacco on the forfeiture of any constitutional protections the
appellees have to their trade secrets.").
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Sixth Amendment right to trial;' 6 the right to appeal; 1 7 and the right to access
to a federal forum.s8
One theorist has described unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as
triggered when governmental action creates the biconditional "if -x, then y;
and if x, then ~y."1 59 This formulation dovetails with the Supreme Court's
most recent explication of the doctrine, in Justice Alito's majority opinion
in Koontz: that whether the individual whose rights are under pressure chooses
the benefit or the right is irrelevant. 6o Under this conceit, the sort of situation
created by border checkpoints and H.B. 2 is a quintessential unconstitutional-
conditions problem. If the individual chooses to undergo questioning as to
immigration status by the Border Patrol, she may travel north to access
abortion services; if she declines to exercise her right to access an abortion, she
may protect herself from such immigration enforcement by remaining in the
border zone.'6' A state actor presumably could not directly create a barrier to an
individual's travel to access abortion."2 The unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine means that the indirect creation of a barrier, by legislating out of
existence all the clinics within a given area and consequently giving rise to the
biconditional, is likewise impermissible.6 ,
156. See, e.g., United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that
conditioning the Sixth Amendment right to trial on an increased sentence is constitutionally
impermissible).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 577 (5th Cir. 1992) (determining that
conditioning the right to appeal on a plea decision is unconstitutional).
158. See, e.g., 1616 Reminc Ltd. P'ship v. Atchison & Keller Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.14 (4 th Cir.
1983) ("We do not construe the seeking of protection in a bankruptcy proceeding as an
implied consent to trial by an otherwise unconstitutional tribunal, lest we move towards
condonation of unconstitutional conditions on access to a federal forum.").
159. Berman, supra note 145, at 1o. Others who view the doctrine as requiring the grant or denial
of affirmative governmental benefits might disagree with this formulation. Cf Sullivan,
supra note 137, at 1422 (describing the Supreme Court in the late 1980s as taking "a narrow
view of affirmative government obligations" in the unconstitutional-conditions context).
16o. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) ("The principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and
Dolan do not change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the
condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because the applicant
refuses to do so.").
161. The situation highlights the significance of travel as a predicate right or privilege on which
the meaningful exercise of other rights depends. Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 177-79 (1980).
162. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) ("An undue burden
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its . . . effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.").
163. Cf Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 76o F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014), petitionfor cert.
filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc.
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This straightforward formulation, though, elides some of the messiness of
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as formulated and explicated by the
federal courts. 64 First, and least problematically, we might question whether
abortion access is a right that falls within the scope of unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine at all. Next, we might wonder whether the biconditional
formulation is appropriate here-whether not having to cross immigration
checkpoints is a "discretionary benefit" for the purposes of the doctrine. We
might then ask whether there is any conditioning at all and, if so, whether that
conditioning is in fact constitutionally impermissible. And, lastly, we ought to
consider the fact that the application of the unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine in this circumstance, where the decisions as to the grant or denial of
the benefit and the creation of the condition are due to the independent actions
of a state and a federal actor, implicates the role of intentionality in the
doctrine.
The unconstitutional-conditions analysis deserves a caveat. The doctrine
both is part of constitutional common law and applies in a variety of doctrinal
contexts regarding individual rights.' Consequently, it is not the most
straightforward area of doctrinal analysis; like all human constructs, it is
imperfectly articulated. But it is a methodological tool that sheds particular
light on situations in which individual rights seem constrained rather than
expanded by choice. This Part's analysis starts from the basic premises that
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, while not perfectly contoured in all
respects, is an ordinary feature of constitutional law, and that its implications
for the border zone deserve attention.16 6
v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). Recall, too, that undocumented status is
irrelevant to substantive due process rights. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
164. Cf Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo Cty. Tex., Inc. v. Suchs, 692 F.3d 343, 349 (5th
Cir. 2012) (describing an "unfortunate lack of clarity" in unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine despite the "clear threshold premise" that "[a] funding condition cannot be
unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly" (quoting Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 (20o6))); Rende Lettow
Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards, iol Nw. U.
L. REV. 775, 775 (2007) (terming the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine "a doctrinal and
scholarly morass").
165. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text.
166. Twenty-two years ago, the Supreme Court described the existence of unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine as "well-settled." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). The
opinions in the seven Supreme Court cases discussing the doctrine since Dolan confirm that
interpretation: in none of them does any Justice call into question the basic conceit of the
doctrine, or that the government may not condition the grant of a benefit on not exercising a
right. See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013);
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Forum for Acad. &
Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); United
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A. The Right
Unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has particular salience in the
abortion context, as is relevant to the fact-specific problem of H.B. 2.
Two selective-funding cases-Maher v. Roe, challenging Connecticut's
funding of pregnancy expenses but not abortions for indigent women,'6 7 and
Harris v. McRae, challenging similar federal funding restrictions in the
Medicaid program'6 8 -have been interpreted as paradigmatic unconstitutional-
conditions cases that shed light on a germaneness requirement for a condition
to be constitutional.' Rust v. Sullivan, which held that restrictions on federal
funding for abortion counseling did not violate individuals' abortion rights
because the restrictions did not change women's available choices, also used
unconstitutional-conditions reasoning.o70  More recently, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have applied unconstitutional-conditions reasoning to
determine whether abortion rights were impermissibly burdened.7 ' The benefit
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Bd. of Cry. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668 (1996); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); see also Ohio
Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 279, 286 (1998) (noting the Sixth Circuit's
application of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine to what the court of appeals
characterized as "a 'Hobson's choice' between asserting . . . Fifth Amendment rights and
participating in the clemency review process" but concluding that reaching the
unconstitutional-conditions analysis was "unnecessary"). Lower courts have analyzed
potential constitutional violations using the doctrine many times. See, e.g., Dep't of Tex.,
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm'n, 760 F.3d 427, 437 (5th Cir.
2014); Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814 (1oth Cir. 2014);
Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237 ( 9 th Cit. 2013); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d So9 (6th Cir. 2012); L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. County of St. Louis,
673 F.3d 799 (8th Cit. 2012); Pareja v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 615 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2010);
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 53o F.3d 1320 (ith Cir. 2008); DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cit. 2007); O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187 (2d
Cit. 2005); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 44o (4 th Cir. 2004); Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Wyman, 335 F-3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F. 3d 361
(7th Cit. 1999); Clifton v. FEC, 114 F. 3d 1309 (1st Cit. 1997). Not all of these cases find that
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine invalidates state action in the fact-specific scenario,
but all probe whether it does apply and view such application leading to invalidation as
possible, either on those facts or on a different set of facts.
167. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
168. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
16g. Berman, supra note 145, at 103-10; see also Kreimer, supra note 144, at 1346; Sullivan, supra
note 137, at 1416.
170. 500 U.S. 173, 201-02 (1991); see also Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 211 (relying on Rust for its
unconstitutional-conditions analysis).
171. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F-3d 962
(7th Cit. 2012) (ultimately finding an unconstitutional-conditions claim unlikely to succeed
because, since the government could directly refuse to subsidize abortion, conditioning of
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involved in these cases, selective funding, is different from that at stake in the
context of border checkpoints and H.B. 2. But the cases demonstrate that for
the right at issue- abortion- application of the unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine is not unusual.72
B. The Benefit
More significantly, both case law and much of the academic literature
consistently describe the forbidden choice in an unconstitutional-conditions
problem as one between a right and a "discretionary benefit."'7 Is nonexposure
to spatially selective immigration enforcement a "discretionary benefit," within
the meaning of unconstitutional-conditions doctrine? 4 It is-or, at the least,
we ought to recognize it as such. The doctrine is unclear, and there appears to
have been no case implicating the border checkpoints in which courts have
applied unconstitutional-conditions analysis."s But the best interpretation,
most consonant with the purposes that underlie unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine, is to view it as such. In a way, such extension would be novel -but it
both is consistent with case law and makes sense in light of the constitutional
common-law nature of the doctrine.' 6
Most case law deals with situations involving governmental withholding of
affirmative benefits due to exercise of a right, rather than governmental
abortion-related funding was permissible); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc.
v. Dempsey, 167 F. 3d 458, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying an unconstitutional-conditions
analysis in evaluating a state statute barring grants of family-planning funds to
organizations providing abortion services).
172. The broad formulation of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine indicates that the
doctrine would still apply even in the absence of precedential cases. See supra notes 138-143
and accompanying text.
173. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2605 (2013) (quoting
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)).
174. This analysis is unrelated to a separate debate as to whether systematized grants of deferred
action "confer 'lawful presence' and associated benefits" such as "driver's licenses and
unemployment insurance" and therefore are reviewable agency actions. See Texas v. United
States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *16 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (evaluating whether
the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans program is a presumptively unreviewable act
of prosecutorial discretion). That debate draws on an unrelated line of case law on
administrative actions "committed to agency discretion." See id. at *12.
175. The leading cases analyzing whether interior checkpoints constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation, for example, do not use such an approach. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
176. See generally Strauss, supra note 8o (detailing common-law methods of interpretation under
a framework that views the Constitution as a mixed system).
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withholding of enforcement or punishment.'7 Some cases, however, indicate
that the denial of withholding of enforcement qualifies as a "benefit." At least
two Supreme Court opinions have appeared to apply unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine in an enforcement or punishment context, though neither
explicitly situates itself within the doctrine. Zablocki v. Redhail overturned a
state statute requiring court approval of marriage for those required to pay
child support on the grounds that the statute "unnecessarily impinge[d] on the
right to marry";' 8 United States v. Jackson overturned the portion of the Federal
Kidnapping Act that took the death penalty off the table only if the defendant
forewent exercising the right to a jury trial.179
This case law and, more broadly speaking, the common-law nature of the
doctrine's elaboration counsel against an overly restrictive interpretation of
cases' "discretionary benefit" language. Unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
has developed over time as a judicial understanding of a particular way that
governmental action may engender a harm rising to the level of a constitutional
violation. 8 o And, while academic commentators have diverged over the
underlying logic of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine,'8' recent
moves toward more coherent and systematizing understandings of the
doctrine as one of framing suggests such a broader scope for "benefit.",8,
Indeed, some scholars view the doctrine as, on a best understanding,
encompassing discretionary enforcement decisions.8
Interpreting the avoidance of a certain encounter with immigration
enforcement as a discretionary benefit therefore fits well within the contours of
existing unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. It also makes sense in terms of
the harm that courts describe unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as
177. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text. Despite recent, seemingly widespread
application of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine in the courts of appeals, there seems
to be no recent comprehensive analysis of how courts have applied the doctrine across
constitutional provisions.
178. 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
179. 390 U.S. 570, 581-83, 591 (1968); see also Berman, supra note 145, at 102 n.438 (interpreting
Jackson as an unconstitutional-conditions case).
iso. See Kreimer, supra note 144, at 1301-04 (describing the doctrine's early development).
181. Compare Berman, supra note 145, and Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications ofExit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and
Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61 (2012), with Kreimer, supra note 144, and Sullivan, supra note
137, and Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 337 (1989) (provocatively questioning the doctrine's very existence).
182. Cox & Samaha, supra note 181, at 69 ("[A]lmost any constitutional question can be turned
into an unconstitutional conditions question by expanding the frame of reference."); Daryl
J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, i1 YALE L.J. 1311, 1345-50 (2002).
183. Cox & Samaha, supra note 18i, at 15-16.
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intending to capture - the pressure that an individual experiences to make a
particular choice, given the incentive structure set up by the choice
architecture.
C. Conditioning
In a situation like that engendered by H.B. 2, then, where governmental
action forecloses access to rights within the border zone, an individual faces a
choice between exercise of the right and avoiding spatially selective
immigration enforcement-the kind of "Hobson's choice" that courts have
deemed impermissible.' Under the legal regime created by the current
intersection of federal immigration enforcement and state law -both of which
have spatially distortive effects - a person may either refrain from passing
through border checkpoints and therefore refrain from undergoing a search
that exposes her to the risk of selective immigration enforcement, or she may
obtain an abortion. She cannot do both.
Consequently, the intersection of border checkpoints and fundamental
rights falls squarely on the nongermaneness side of the germaneness or nexus
requirement running through the case law. Case law indicates that, for a
condition placed upon a right to be constitutionally permissible, there must be
some sort of "nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the condition and
the right.86 For example, in the exactions context, a court must determine
whether there is a connection "between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition" and then "must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development."* Relying on this test, the
Supreme Court determined in Dolan v. City of Tigard that requiring the grant
of a pedestrian and bike easement in order to obtain a permit for commercial
expansion did not exhibit the requisite rough proportionality.
184. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
iss. E.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F. 3d 24, 50 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that a "Hobson's
choice" created by the conditional choice that one "either comply with the Disclosure Act
and forfeit [one's] valuable trade secrets or withdraw from the lucrative Massachusetts
market" constituted an unconstitutional condition). The "Hobson's choice" framing of the
problem also recurs in academic literature. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1438.
186. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383, 391 (1994).
187. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
iss. Id. at 395 (stating that "the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by [the] development reasonably relate to the
[easement] requirement").
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The distinction between germaneness and nongermaneness i  particularly
vivid in the abortion-funding cases Maher v. Roe'' and Harris v. McRae.'90
In these cases, the Supreme Court upheld funding restrictions in which
government-subsidized healthcare programs recompensed individuals for
pregnancy and childbirth expenses but not for elective abortions.'9' The Court
in Maher characterized the statute at issue as creating no further obstacles to
abortion, explaining that "[a]n indigent woman ... continues as before to be
dependent on private sources."" It differentiated cases striking down
durational-residency requirements to receive welfare benefits on, apparently,
germaneness grounds: denial of "bus fares" to travelers, the Court implied,
would have been permissible, but denial of welfare was closer to "a criminal
fine."1 3 Similarly, Harris emphasized that the denial of general benefits to
anyone who secured an abortion would create a "substantial constitutional
question."194 These cases - and the manner in which they differentiate the
durational-residency cases-indicate that something akin to the "nexus" and
"rough proportionality" requirements in the Takings Clause cases applies, as
well, in the abortion-rights context. While they do not use that specific
language, the underlying requirement of a sufficiently strong connection
between the right conditioned and the benefit appears to be the same. More
broadly, the cases suggest-particularly in combination with the later Takings
Clause cases - that the unconstitutional conditions doctrinal inquiry keys, at
least in part, to germaneness.1 95
There is no nexus between the enforcement of immigration law and the
seeking of access to abortion services. Unlike in the selective-funding cases,
state-generated closure of clinics within the border zone leads to consequences
beyond state "refusal to subsidize certain protected conduct.",96 Abortion
189. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
190. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
191. Though Harris and Maher do not explicitly use the phrase "unconstitutional conditions,"
academic commentators have frequently interpreted the cases as unconstitutional-conditions
cases. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 145, at 1o3-lo; David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
675, 695 (1992); Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1466-67.
192. 432 U.S. at 474.
193. Id. at 474 n.8.
194. 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
195. This interpretation is in line with that of scholars who note germaneness's alience to
judges, even while attempting to theorize a clearer or more comprehensive framework. E g.,
Berman, supra note 145, at 42; Cox & Samaha, supra note 18l, at 8o; Caleb Nelson, Judicial
Review ofLegislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1870 (2008).
196. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
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access and immigration enforcement are not linked by a common policy
concern. The consequences if one exercises the right are simply not germane.
There is also a lack of proportionality between the exercise of abortion
rights and the enforcement of immigration law. The idea that conditioning the
right to abortion on hazarding detention and deportation unconstitutionally
"coerc[es]" undocumented women "into giving . . . up" a substantive due
process right is intuitive.' Both the magnitude and the perceived likelihood of
the harms of detention and deportation are great.9' Requiring individuals, for
the exercise of the right, to risk the loss of home, community, and potentially
family and livelihood - potentially "all that makes life worth living"' - seems
more analogous to the "criminal fine" that the Maher Court suggested was
impermissible.2o These costs are greater than others that the Court has found
unconstitutional, such as requiring that individuals give up a tax exemption,"
public employment,o" or the possibility of unemployment benefits to exercise
a fundamental right." A state actor could not directly impose a bar on an
unauthorized immigrant's access to abortion, since doing so would be a
violation of substantive due process rights." The current choice architecture
conditions exercise of a constitutional substantive due process right on the
denial of something of great value - not having the government assuredly
perform a search to detect one's immigration status, a search that is likely
to lead to civil enforcement of the immigration laws.20 Such a state-
structured choice, if the absence of selective enforcement is a benefit, is an
unconstitutional conditioning of a person's right to terminate her pregnancy.
197. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013).
198. See supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
199. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
zoo. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977).
201. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958).
202. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
zo3. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). The Sixth Circuit has found conditioning
the grant of a liquor license on giving up a property interest in operating during certain
hours constitutionally impermissible. R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427,
434 - 35 (6th Cir. 2005).
204. Again, unauthorized immigrants possess ubstantive due process rights. See supra notes 74-
79 and accompanying text.
20S. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties in determining
the likelihood of enforcement.
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D. Intentionality?
The choice created for undocumented immigrants by the checkpoints and
potential clinic closures thus fits relatively comfortably within
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, given the existing doctrinal ambiguities
and the open question as to this kind of administrative enforcement discretion
as benefit. Most if not all unconstitutional-conditions cases, though, involve
both a benefit and a rights burden engendered by a single state actor.m6 Here,
the federal administrative enforcement scheme provides the benefit, while the
state's regulation places the burden on the right. Does a choice between rights
exercise and benefit brought about by the separate actions of two different
actors - one state and one federal - create an unconstitutional condition? This
question implicates whether unconstitutional-conditions doctrine bars a
coercive purpose or a coercive effect -an area of the doctrine that is unclear. If
the doctrine is effects oriented, then H.B. 2 is an unconstitutional condition.
Even if it is purpose oriented, though, there are reasons to think that on either
analysis H.B. 2's conditioning is constitutionally problematic, due to the Texas
legislature's knowledge of the border area.
In analyzing governmental actions through an unconstitutional-conditions
lens, courts have not clearly distinguished between a coercive purpose and
a coercive effect.2o7 This lack of clarity matters to situations with multiple
actors, like the border zone and H.B. 2. On the one hand, without purpose,
the choice that individuals face is no less rights pressuring-it presumably
does not matter to one's decision as to whether to go through an
immigration checkpoint or forgo obtaining an abortion which governmental
entities are responsible for creating the choice. On the other, if the point of
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is to bar governmental actors from
threatening or coercing individuals -from tilting incentives in a way that the
government prefers, because of the asymmetrical power to grant or deny a
benefit that the governmental actor holds-then perhaps the presence of
multiple actors does matter.
This unresolved tension is on display in Koontz. In one sentence, Justice
Alito's majority opinion explains, "By conditioning a building permit on the
owner's deeding over a public right-of-way ... the government can pressure an
206. A comprehensive accounting of unconstitutional conditions case law in the federal courts is
beyond the scope of this Note-possibly, one or more cases exist that would fit within the
unconstitutional-conditions rubric that involve multiple actors.
207. See Berman, supra note 145, at 20-21 (describing how governmental action may be
unconstitutional due to its purpose, effect, or particularized conduct). While this invocation
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owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment
would otherwise require just compensation."" The emphasis here seems to be
on what the opinion then characterizes as "the government's demand"2 o9 - on a
governmental action. At the end of that paragraph, though, the opinion
concludes, "Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment
right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits
them."'o This concluding sentence places the emphasis not on the act of
demanding or some sort of mens rea requirement-not on governmental
purpose-but rather on the loss of just compensation." The tension is,
perhaps, best encapsulated in Koontz's characterization of the "overarching
principle": "the unconstitutional conditions doctrine . . . vindicates the
Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing
people into giving them up."2
Whether such "coerci[on]" requires governmental intentionality is not
resolved in the constitutional common law of unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine. The Supreme Court's unconstitutional-conditions cases appear not to
have explicitly confronted the issue. Language in lower-court opinions
diverges - some seem to place some emphasis on "purpose," while others do
not require purpose." The opinions in both Supreme Court and lower-court
cases tend not to probe legislative history to discern bad motive or otherwise
engage in some sort of familiar motive-based inquiry. Many cases focus on the
situation created for individuals, from needing to give up a right to just
compensation in exchange for a land-use permit, to being required to engage in
certain speech to receive money, to having to forgo unemployment benefits due
to practicing one's religion." Among academic commentators, some view the
intent of the state actor as essential-as the constitutional problem with
208. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013).
zog. Id. at 2595.
21o. Id. (emphasis added).
211. See Berman, supra note 145, at 20-21 (noting that a rights-based framing is one of effect, not
purpose).
212. 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
213. Compare, Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699
F. 3d 962, 986 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he denial of a public benefit may not be used by the
government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not
command directly." (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (plurality opinion))),
with Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F-3d 1303, 1324-25 (ith Cir. 2004) (describing
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as "prevent[ing] the Government from subtly
pressuring citizens, whether purposely or inadvertently, into surrendering their rights").
214. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603; Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
1789
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
unconstitutional conditions."s Others see intent as not required for a rights-
pressuring choice to be an unconstitutional condition. 6
Due to the doctrinal ambiguities and the lack of a specific textual
grounding for this multipurpose doctrine, whether one thinks intent matters in
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine may ultimately hinge on whether one
views the doctrine as rights regarding or regulatory. If the purpose is to shield
the individual from governmental choice, then governmental intent may not
matter, while a purpose of barring governmental actions with bad intent may
make intent more salient." The lack of focus on governmental purpose or
mens rea in case law may point to an existing understanding of the doctrine as
rights regarding. The coercion language, though, is less clear. The idea that a
pressured choice forced on an individual by a governmental actor- regardless
of the actor's motivation -creates an impermissible constitutional burden on a
right may have intuitive resonance. It parallels duress doctrine in contract
law." Particularly, where liberty is at stake as the "benefit," as in the detention
and deportation context, the conditioned choice may seem especially
constitutionally suspect: the effects of the choice are likely far more pronounced.
There are very good reasons to think that intent does not matter;" and if it
does not, then H.B. 2 and the border checkpoints create an unconstitutional
condition.
Even if intent does matter, though, state actors' disregard for the spatially
disparate effects of H.B. 2 could conceivably cross a requisite level of intent.
The line for a governmental actor's improper mens rea in creating coercive
conditions may not necessarily cut through specific intent to deprive
individuals of the right. Texas legislators are-or at least ought to be-well
aware of the conditions in their state, including the conditions in the Rio
Grande Valley, the many unauthorized immigrants who live there, and
215. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 195, at 1861-71 (arguing that "[m]uch of the modern doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is best understood in terms of restrictions on the reasons for
which government can act" because such an understanding best explains, inter alia,
germaneness).
216. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 145, at 20-21.
217. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1997) (drawing a similar division in constitutionalized criminal
procedure).
218. See Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1443-44.
219. Such a view of the doctrine is particularly consonant with an understanding of
constitutional structure, including federalism, as rights protective. See Bond v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 ("Federalism secures the freedom of the individual."); see also
infra Section 1V.B (discussing the implications of this view of federalism for a state's action
in the border zone).
1790
125: 1744 2016
BORDER CHECKPOINTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
the existence of border checkpoints.o Media coverage surrounding
undocumented women and access to abortion began before the passage of
H.B. 2." The debate over H.B. 2 focused in part on the particular challenges
that the bill would pose to individuals living in the Rio Grande Valley and El
Paso in reaching clinics.' If knowledge or recklessness, not purpose or specific
intent to deprive, suffices for intentionality in the unconstitutional-conditions
context,23 then H.B. 2-and other regulations with spatially disparate effects -
crosses that threshold. Because of the lack of doctrinal clarity, under a view of
the doctrine as regulatory or intent based, states' reckless or knowing actions
with effects on undocumented immigrants' choices in the border zone may
satisfy intent and give rise to an unconstitutional condition. On an effects-
based view, of course, no such intentionality is required-and the choice
between exercising the right to an abortion and avoiding exposure to
immigration enforcement is an unconstitutional condition.
Viewing spatially selective immigration enforcement as an
unconstitutional-conditions problem-not only in the H.B. 2 context but more
broadly- comports with the underlying "nexus" or "germaneness" thread
running through the doctrine and concomitant intuitions as to which
government-structured choice architectures for rights are permissible. One's
immigration status and the exercise of one's right to determine whether to
carry a pregnancy to term are unrelated.
220. See, e.g., TEx. SECRETARY STATE, COLONIA LEGIS. TEx., http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border
/colonias/legislation.shtml [http://perma.cc/CN3G-FBZ6] (listing the legislative
enactments from 1987 to 2005 dealing specifically with extreme poverty in the Rio Grande
Valley).
221. See supra note S9 and accompanying text.
222. See 83 TEx. LEG. H.J. S36 (July 9, 2013) (statement of Rep. Farrar) ("In other words,
Lubbock, El Paso, McAllen, Corpus Christi, Lufkin, those folks in those places would not
have access."); id. at S37 (statement of Rep. Menindez) ("[I]f they do close, and we take
away the only place, the only clinic where someone in a rural city, whether it be Lubbock or
El Paso or the Valley, wherever, then we, as a state, should say we did this and we need to
step up . . . ."). See generally id. at S35-42 (discussing the effect of H.B. 2 on communities,
including the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso, far from major cities with abortion clinics
projected to remain open).
223. See MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.02 (AM. LAw INST. 1962) (describing categories of culpability);
cf Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of
Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 112, 124 (1983) (advocating that equal-protection doctrine
take into account the varying degrees of intentionality recognized in criminal law and
arguing that "[a] legislature should be charged with either actual or constructive knowledge
of potential burdens its acts will impose on minorities").
1791
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
This characterization of the problem, while apparently novel in the
immigration-enforcement context, also sounds in constitutional norms of due
process and an underlying anticaste principle.' In considering the problem
from a due-process perspective, it is possible that deprivation of an unrelated
fundamental right is the penalty that one pays for an immigration violation, for
a tax penalty, or for punishment for the commission of a crime. But, even
assuming that is the case,22 such deprivation should be due after the
government has determined that an individual is culpable, not before. The
group of people who will be ensnared through exposure to civil or criminal law
enforcement is larger than the group of people who will be eligible for
deportation, who will be guilty of the crime, or who will need to pay income
taxes -the list of potential "suspects" is almost always longer than the list of
those actually convicted or liable. In the immigration context, individuals who
are eligible for asylum may not be aware of the prevailing law or may not have
the resources to go through the legal process; those ligible for withholding of
removal may not want to risk exposing themselves to immigration enforcement
for the chance of receiving this discretionary relief.n6 These persons are in fact
able to obtain status and remain in the United States, but they too will be
swept up in the enforcement and will need to extricate themselves, losing their
liberty in the meantime.
From an antisubordination perspective, as Kathleen Sullivan observes in
the context of affirmative benefits," allowing the conditioning of fundamental
rights on exposure to an enforcement mechanism creates a two-tiered system
of rights, in which only those subject to enforcement face the coercive pressure.
Because undocumented immigrants not only have, as a class, less political
power than those with legal status, but also face potential enforcement
consequences by asserting political voice, they are, as a class, particularly at risk
for the creation of impermissible choices." The unconstitutional-conditions
224. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2411 (1994)
(characterizing the anticaste principle as an "understanding of equality [and] liberty," which
"forbids social and legal practices from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant
differences into systemic social disadvantage" without "very good reason for society to do
so").
225. The lack of germaneness between the two in the checkpoints context and the lack of
evidence of specific legislative intent suggests that, at least for H.B. 2, the Texas legislature
did not intend to create such a penalty.
226. See 8 U.S.C. 5 1158 (2012) (asylum process); id. § 1231(b)(3) (withholding of removal).
227. See Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1499.
228. Cf Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1286, 1444 (1983) ("[T]he illegal status of undocumented aliens prevents them from
claiming an effective voice in the political process.").
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framework does not doctrinally require either of these underlying resonances,
but they provide a sense that the doctrinal evaluation of the border-checkpoints
problem fits with the larger constitutional system. The checkpoints and state
legislation careless to its spatial effects, when they combine to pressure
individual rights in the border zone, are best understood as constitutionally
impermissible.
IV. CAUSATION AT CHECKPOINTS
Finally, part of the puzzle as to whether H.B. 2-or any spatially disparate
state regulation that removes access to a fundamental right from within the
border zone-violates undocumented immigrants' rights is a question of
causation, which in turn implicates federalism questions. The bar to rights
vindication is the conjunction of state regulatory action and a federal
administrative enforcement scheme, predicated on spatiality, that
problematizes travel for individuals subject to enforcement. For purposes of
constitutional analysis, is a deprivation of the right to reproductive choice
caused by Texas's law leading to clinic closures? The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state "shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."" But do the Texas abortion restrictions
themselves "deprive any person" of the right to reproductive choice-given
that, in the absence of the checkpoints, the closure of clinics requiring travel
out of the border zone could23o pose no barrier at all?
This Part argues that when a state passes a law, like H.B. 2, that
removes access to a right within its borders from the area between the
international border and the checkpoints, the state is legally responsible for
that rights deprivation. This legal responsibility exists notwithstanding the
federal government's actions in creating the anomalous zone and the lack
of immigration status that places individuals at risk of enforcement action.
Both the doctrinal-causation principles applied in evaluating Fourteenth
Amendment violations and larger constitutional commitments-to the
vindication of individual rights notwithstanding federal-state allocations of
power -lead to this conclusion.
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230. Whether other obstacles to obtaining an abortion caused by the clinic closures ensuing from
H.B. 2 make H.B. 2 unconstitutional is beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. Doctrinal Causation
The Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 together create a
"species of tort liability" for those "deprived of rights," as well as the possibility
of injunctive relief against state action." In this context, to determine whether
there is sufficient causation to constitute a "depriv[ation]" of rights, courts are
"governed by ... common-law tort principles,"3' including proximate cause"'
and the idea of a causal chain.' Consequently, a state's action that removes
access to rights in the border zone must be both a factual and a proximate cause
of the resultant harm in order to constitute a substantive due process violation,
and there must be no superseding cause that breaks the causal chain."s
H.B. 2 is plainly a factual cause of the resultant harm-the infringement
on the abortion rights of a particular segment of Texas's population. Were
H.B. 2 not to take full effect, women living in south Texas would still have
access to abortion clinics within the border zone; they would not need to
231. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 2S3 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417
(1976)). Section 1983 provides a private right of action for those deprived of constitutional
rights by a person acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (2012). Prospective
injunctive relief is also available under the cause of action pursuant to
the Ex parte Young doctrine. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979) ("[Iln a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action . . . a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective [and not retrospective] injunctive relief,
Exparte Young. . . .").
232. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (explaining that "federal rules conforming in
general to common-law tort principles" apply to 5 1983 actions, where state-law principles
do not).
233. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 n-7 (1986) ("[Section] 1983 'should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions.'" (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961))).
234. See id. (applying common-law tort principles to determine that a judicial decision regarding
a warrant issuance does not "break[] the causal chain" between an officer's application for
the warrant and the arrest pursuant to the warrant).
235. Cf Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7 (noting that 5 1983 "should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his action");
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (noting that superseding causes can break the causal chain, but
holding that a judge's decision to issue a warrant does not break the causal chain between a
law enforcement officer's application for a warrant and an improvident arrest). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL. HARM §5 26-36 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (discussing the basic causation principles of tort law).
236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (defining conduct as a factual cause where harm would not have occurred if
the conduct in question had not occurred).
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travel beyond the checkpoints. The legislation is also a proximate cause."' As
in situations in which the Supreme Court has found sufficient proximate cause
for constitutional liability, 8 the encumbrance on undocumented women's
reproductive rights is a "natural consequence[]" of Texas's action in enacting
H.B. 2.23 As noted above, the state legislature was aware both that the
checkpoints existed and that the legislation threatened to close the clinics south
and west of the checkpoints."4 The potential for clinic closures to ensue from
H.B. 2 and the resultant inability of undocumented women to continue to
access abortion services were "reasonably foreseeable," in the language of tort
law.IL
The sharper (and more interesting) doctrinal question is whether the
two other factual causes of the rights violation-the federal immigration
enforcement scheme and individuals' immigration status-break the causal
chain. Were there no border checkpoints, H.B. 2 would cause no particular
infringement on the abortion rights of unauthorized immigrants. And if
undocumented immigrants instead had lawful immigration status, the interior
checkpoints would give rise to no particular undue burden or unconstitutional
condition. Ultimately, both on a technical causation analysis and- as Section
1V.B argues -consistent with constitutional allocations of power, neither
suffices to overcome state legal responsibility for the deprivation of the right.
The State of Texas, or any state with internal checkpoints, is responsible for
substantive due process violations due to actions that remove access to rights in
the border zone."
Under common-law tort analysis, intervening acts by independent actors
typically do not foreclose tort liability where those actions were foreseeable."
237. See id. § 29 ("An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that
made the actor's conduct ortious."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAw
INST. 1965); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 199 (2d ed. 20n1).
238. See, e.g., Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7.
239. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187; accord Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-
57 (1967).
240. See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
241. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 237, 5 204.
242. Whether the state would have an affirmative duty to provide access to services in the border
zone - for example, to provide abortion clinics should none exist in the area - is a different
question. Such affirmative provision of benefits would likely not be required under existing
doctrine, at least where the state does not undertake to provide such benefits for all
individuals within its territory. Cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (198o) (not requiring
Medicaid to cover abortion expenses); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same).
243. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 (AM.
LAw INST. 2011) ("When a force of nature or an independent act is also a factual cause ... an
actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's
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The Supreme Court has previously followed such common-law interpretations
of the significance of actions by independent state actors that potentially
break the causal chain." It has determined that where "the common law
recognized the causal link . . . we read § 1983 as recognizing the same causal
link.""s Internal immigration checkpoints are foreseeable to legislators in states
that contain them. Indeed, the checkpoints have existed in some form for
decades - their presence is not a surprise." Moreover, the effects of the
checkpoints on movements of persons are well known in the areas where they
exist." Additionally, the presence of significant numbers of undocumented
immigrants in the border area is easily anticipatable from history and present
demographics.'8 The harm of certain persons in the border zone being
deprived of the ability to obtain abortions is a foreseeable risk of passing a bill
that closes clinics in the border zone-and so the foreseeable actions of the
federal government in maintaining spatially selective immigration enforcement
do not remove legal responsibility from the State of Texas for the deprivation
of rights.
Nor does the nature of immigration status obviate the rights violation
engendered by cutting off access to abortion within the border area. A potential
objection to seeing H.B. 2 as causal in this context might be, essentially, a
contributory-negligence argument. Sure, one might argue, unauthorized
immigrants might have substantive due process rights-but, the objection
might run, they are responsible for their presence in the border zone.
Consequently, any spatially uneven effects of state regulation- anything that
removes rights access from the border zone -is not a constitutional problem,
because the salient cause of the rights violation is not the legislation but the
action or presence of undocumented persons.
This argument fails both doctrinally, as a matter of common-law causation,
and constitutionally, in light of existing substantive due process doctrine.
Doctrinally, in the move from contributory negligence to comparative fault in
tort law, the plaintiffs own actions are typically no longer regarded as an
conduct tortious."); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 237, § 204; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM S 19 (AM. LAw INST. 2011) ("The conduct
of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits
the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.").
244. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 f-7.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating that an
interior checkpoint in southern California had "been in operation at least since" 1929).
247. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975).
248. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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intervening cause sufficient to break a causal chain and give rise to liability."
Instead, the plaintiffs actions are ordinarily regarded as part of the causal set
and evaluated accordingly.so As with other potential superseding causes, the
actions will not foreclose liability (in this instance, liability on the part of the
State of Texas) due to "risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.""' Again,
the presence of undocumented immigrants in the border area is foreseeable."
Constitutionally, to the extent that this interpretation is predicated in a sense of
moral or legal delict, it does not mesh with substantive due process doctrine
any more than it does with common-law doctrine. It makes little sense to
construe substantive due process doctrine as encompassing undocumented
immigrants," but then to exclude certain undocumented immigrants from
substantive due process protections, based on where in the United States - and
in which part of a particular state - they happened to reside.
B. Individual Rights: Federalism's Failure?
The border zone represents the failure of federal-state allocations of power
alone to protect or further individual rights. In Bond v. United States, Justice
Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court, "By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the
liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.""' The opinion theorized
249. See DOBBS ET AL., Supra note 237, § 215.
250. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 19
(AM. LAw INST. 2011).
251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 5 34 (AM. LAw
INST. 2011).
252. Even if unauthorized immigration were construed as a culpable act, because the presence of
undocumented immigrants in the border zone is foreseeable, that act would not break the
causal chain. See id. § i9 (viewing the touchstone of an actor's liability as foreseeability, even
in light of other actors' culpable acts). This outcome makes sense in light of the
Constitution's protection of substantive due process rights for unauthorized immigrants
within the United States. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. An alternative result
would be inconsistent with prior cases, in which courts have viewed governmental actions
singling out undocumented immigrants, like denial of bail, as violations of substantive due
process-even though the governmental action would not have occurred but-for the
individual's undocumented status. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 77o F.3d 772, 781 (9 th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2046 (201S); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
254. 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). The Bond Court held that an individual had standing to
challenge the validity of the federal criminal statute under which she was indicted as a
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 2360. Bond's holding refers to an "individual." Id.
at 2363. The language in the opinion toggles between "individual" and "citizen" in
describing the benefits of diffuse federal power. Compare id. at 2364 ("[Federalism secures
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federalism as rights protecting for individuals, both through this diffusion of
power and in the fueling of state innovation and responsiveness to individual
voice.2ss Federalism scholars have viewed the LGBT marriage-equality
movement as exemplifying this kind of rights-protecting function of federal-
state allocations of power. Heather Gerken sees marriage equality as an
instantiation of how " [f] ederalism and rights have long served as interlocking
gears moving us forward.",2,6 Ernest Young describes how exit and voice in the
federal system furthered the interests of same-sex couples and fueled the
LGBT-rights movement, because people were able to move to jurisdictions
where advocates had exercised power to enact marriage equality locally."'
Under this version of the story, Albert Hirschman's familiar frameworks
indicates - in one way or another"9 - how federalism may provide safeguards
for minority rights.
to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992))), with id. ("Federalism secures the freedom
of the individual."). This linguistic switching highlights the continued need to account for
the rights of noncitizens not only on a doctrinal level but also in theorizing the relationship
between distributions of state power and rights allocation.
255. Id. at 2364 (describing federalism as "ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated
governmental power cannot direct or control [individuals'] actions," as "enabl[ing] greater
citizen involvement in democratic processes," and as "mak[ing] government more
responsive by putting the states in competition for a mobile citizenry" (citation omitted)).
This framing echoes Albert Hirschman's framing of means for expressing discontent. See
generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (describing options for those dissatisfied with
governmental policy choices).
256. Heather K. Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure,
95 B.U. L. REv. 587, 594 (2015); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its
Name, 129 HARv. L. REv. F. 16, 28 (2015) (observing that Justice Kennedy's opinions
interpret federalism as "ensur[ing] . . . the negative liberty of shielding persons from
government subordination that invades their equal dignity" and that "the dialogue in the
states and the lower courts [following the invalidation of the Defense of Marriage Act] had
begun to allow equal dignity to shake off its constraining armature"). Gerken notes that
federalism does not inexorably lead to the realization of individual rights or success of social
movements at the national level, since "the gears of rights and structure can move
backwards" to state and local "[r]etrenchment." Gerken, supra, at 599-6oo.
257. Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1137-48 (2014).
258. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 255.
259. Gerken emphasizes the way in which federalism may enable minority groups to influence a
national debate but does not explicitly invoke Hirschman in discussing the marriage-
equality movement, see Gerken, supra note 256, at 6oo, while Young stresses the importance
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These posited means for the federal system to protect the rights of
particularly vulnerable individuals break down, though, for undocumented
immigrants in the border zone. First, the combination of a federal
administrative enforcement scheme and unrelated state regulation here does
not create the diffusion of power preventing "government act[ion] in excess
of .. . lawful powers" described in Bond.260 Instead, in order for federalism to
safeguard individual rights in this context, increased state attention to the
effects of federal exercise of power - and action in accordance with that
attention-is necessary. H.B. 2 demonstrates how the diffusion of power
between the federal and state governments may cause the rights of an especially
vulnerable minority group to fall through the political cracks.
Second, functionally, both exit and voice are greatly restricted for
undocumented immigrants in this space -these individuals are limited in both
political participation and movement. The posited consumer protections of
federalism -shopping for the locale that maximizes utility6 - are unavailable
due to the restrictions on movement created by the checkpoints. Politically,
undocumented persons cannot vote, and speaking out risks exposing one's
immigration status. As a result, any "democratic churn" is unlikely to be
availing for this particular minority group. 13
Yet, the area between the internal checkpoints and the international border
is also within both the United States and a particular state. And the Fourteenth
Amendment is a constitutional commitment to shield all individuals, vis-a-vis
state governments, from the deprivation of substantive due process rights.16 4
The anomalous zone created by the border checkpoints may be an example of
"immigration exceptionalism" in the Fourth Amendment context.26s Border
checkpoints and roving patrols by Border Patrol agents south of the checkpoint
are justified under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said, by the
260. 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
261. See id.
262. This problem, of course, parallels an issue for the LGBT-rights movement before the
decriminalization of same-sex sexual intimacy. See Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented
Closet, 92 N.C. L. REv. 1, 28 (2013) (sketching the similarities between undocumented status
and sexuality in terms of stigma and criminal penalty).
263. Cf Gerken, supra note 28, at 47 (describing the potential for local minority control, if
achieved, to give rise to "a dynamic form of contestation, the democratic churn").
264. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing how undocumented immigrants
hold substantive due process rights).
265. See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1361, 1363 (1999) (characterizing "immigration
exceptionalism" as "the view that immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the
usual limits on government decisionmaking").
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"valid public interest" in restricting the "inland movement" of undocumented
266 Teei ocnretjsiiain
immigrants. There is no congruent justification, though, for deprivation of
access to a substantive due process right. First, unlike Fourth Amendment or
procedural due process inquiries,26' substantive due process analysis is not a
balancing test that gives weight to a governmental interest.6 And even if it
were, the abortion right itself is not linked in any way to the checkpoints'
concern with movement into the rest of the country - unlike Fourth
Amendment rights. 2' Immigration exceptionalism -some sort of idea that the
federal governmental interest in creating and maintaining the administrative
scheme overshadows the vindication of individual rights - has no doctrinal
purchase. It especially does not make sense to read the federal interest as
somehow overwhelming in light of the federal government's continued
exercise of discretion in allowing individuals to live for years or decades in the
border zone.
By contrast, construing Texas's action in enacting H.B. 2 as a
"depriv[ation]" of undocumented immigrants' abortion rights is consistent
with a federalism that "protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary
power."270 Understanding state regulatory action that burdens rights access
in this physical space as causal, such that it constitutes a "deprivation," reflects
the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process protections
notwithstanding state exercises of power embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The details of the causation doctrine cohere with constitutional
commitments.
This analysis, like the unconstitutional-conditions analysis of rights
infringement, extends beyond the specificity of abortion and H.B. 2. One could
imagine state regulations that diminish or foreclose access in the border zone to
other rights that depend on travel for vindication -particularly contraception,
z66. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (checkpoint stops); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) (roving patrols).
267. Both the Fourth Amendment and the procedural due process contexts are arguably areas
of immigration exceptionalism. Courts have construed the procedural due process rights
of those in immigration proceedings as narrower than typical procedural due process
protections. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903); see also supra note 74 and
accompanying text. The border zone may be an example of immigration exceptionalism
regarding Fourth Amendment protections given the anomalies of the roving patrols and the
checkpoints. Cf Mayor, supra note 33, at 647, 650-56 (characterizing Fourth Amendment
rights, in particular, as "work[ing] differently near the border" due to "[their] connection to
sovereignty concerns that are seen as fundamental to the nation-state's survival").
268. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text (oudining the Casey analysis).
269. Cf supra notes 189-196 and accompanying text (discussing the germaneness requirement in
the unconstitutional-conditions context).
270. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
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marriage, or access to medical care." Individuals report forgoing specialized
medical treatment due to fear of exposure to immigration enforcement at
checkpoints." If California, Arizona, New Mexico, or Texas passed legislation
limiting who could dispense contraception, for example-such that the
individuals who fulfilled that role in portions of the border area no longer
could-a very similar problem would arise. Similarly, imagine a situation in
which the only available marriage officiants offered by a state were located
beyond the checkpoints. To the extent that other fundamental rights are
predicated on spatial access, state actions that remove access in the border zone
may pose constitutional problems.
CONCLUSION
Texas's restrictions on abortion clinics, if they reach full effect, will impose
constitutionally impermissible limitations on access to abortion for
undocumented women in the border zone. Under doctrinal analysis specific to
substantive due process, they create an undue burden on this group's right to
obtain an abortion-such that the law is invalid as applied to the clinics in the
border area. At a greater level of abstraction, they give rise to a constitutionally
impermissible choice between vindication of the abortion right and lack of
certain exposure to immigration enforcement- impermissibly conditioning a
right within the denial of a "benefit," under a broad construal of that word that
is most consistent with the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and an
underlying purpose of preventing rights-pressuring choices. This framework is
applicable not only in the abortion context but also to other substantive due
process problems engendered by the checkpoints. Using either framework, and
irrespective of any other constitutional flaws, H.B. 2 deprives more than eighty
thousand spatially and legally marginalized women of the right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy.
The border zone is a site of overlapping sovereigns' regulatory actions -of
federal immigration enforcement efforts and of state regulation pursuant to
state-level legislative goals. The pressure that the independent exercise of these
271. Whether the negative right of access to medical care is in fact a fundamental right may be an
open question. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (describing the
"significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); cf Joseph Blocher, Rights
To and Not To, loo CAuF. L. REV. 761, 77o (theorizing that a constitutional right may be
construed as "a right to, a right not to, or a right to and not to"). H.B. 2 itself diminishes
access to reproductive care, beyond the abortion context, for undocumented women in the
border zone. See Gomez, supra note 57, at 99-loo.
272. See Fernandez, supra note 5; Gamboa, supra note 6.
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powers may place on the substantive due process rights of those caught in the
spatial vise of the border zone has not been taken up. Spatially selective
immigration enforcement's cabining of the movements of a certain set of
individuals - undocumented immigrants - poses problems for theories of how
federal choice may enable rights vindication for marginalized groups. As H.B. 2
demonstrates, federal-state allocations of power in the border space may
endanger fundamental rights. The application of unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine, in particular, provides a way to think through the constitutional
problems posed by that endangerment.
The relationship between spatial access and substantive due process -and,
inversely, between barriers to travel and rights burdens - is not unique to the
space between internal immigration checkpoints and the border. Abortion
cases frequently hinge on travel distances.273 Recent North Carolina legislation
permitting state magistrates to decline to marry same-sex couples might lead to
similar travel problems burdening the right to marry.'7 The Fifth Circuit has
struggled with the question of whether and when "a state can[] lean on its
sovereign neighbors to provide protection of its citizens"' substantive due
process rights;27s may a state ever foreclose all in-state options for abortion,
knowing that out-of-state options exist?276 In the extraterritorial context, the
Supreme Court has weighed but reached no majority consensus as to whether a
citizen has a substantive due process right to live in the United States with a
noncitizen spouse.' The per se bar to undocumented immigrants' movement
out of the border area throws into sharp relief a burden on vindication of
substantive due process rights, in the form of barriers to travel, that typically
take the form of a sliding scale.
This Note provides a case study of how the spatial immigration
enforcement regime created by interior checkpoints may burden fundamental
rights. This conclusion indicates that states that border other countries must
273. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2013)
(reproducing a map of Wisconsin with charted travel distances in concentric circles in a
decision granting a preliminary enjoining of a state statute requiring admitting privileges at
a nearby hospital).
274. Act ofJune 11, 2015, ch. 75, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 2015.
275. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 2014), petition for cert.
filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997).
276. Compare Jackson Women's Health Org., 760 F.3d at 457 (finding that a Mississippi law that
would lead to the closure of all state abortion clinics created an undue burden), with Whole
Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 597-98 (5th Cir.) (finding no undue burden where a
clinic remains available in the same larger metropolitan area, though out of state, and other
clinics are available in the state), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015),
and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
277. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)-
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think carefully about the spatially disparate effects of legislation that may place
pressure on rights. More broadly, it demonstrates the need to take into account
the spatial nature of substantive due process: the ways in which the exercise of
fundamental rights depends in part on political and physical geography.
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